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I. INTRODUCTION

Banks play a unique and important role in our economy. They
serve tremendously useful economic functions; for this reason, our
society has become irretrievably dependent upon them. Banks safeguard our life savings and business profits, and provide capital to
those who need it to buy, invest, or grow.' Although these functions
could be performed without an intermediary-private citizens may
freely lend their cash to other private citizens who need it-banks are
viewed as safer and more efficient controllers of cash flow.2

They

allow depositors to pool their cash resources collectively in one institution; then, retaining a relatively low amount of capital in reserve,
they lend the rest to qualified borrowers, thereby channeling the
3
money in an efficient manner.

See, for example, Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A
1.
Critiqueof the "Source-of-Strength"Doctrinein Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1344, 1345
(1991) (discussing the traditional economic reasons for the existence of banks).
2.
Id.
3.
See Alan Greenspan, Statement to Congress, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 91, 92-94 (Feb. 1988)
(supporting a proposal to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)).

1995]

CROSS-GUARANTEE

1743

In order to be successful in this role, however, banks must be
perceived as "safe" places to store cash. Otherwise, depositors will
not trust banks with their money, and borrowers' ability to obtain
capital will be severely restricted. Banks are dependent on depositor
4
confidence for survival.

At the same time, depositors are just as dependent, if not more
dependent, on the soundness of banks. Banks have gained such a
dominant role in our economy that most people and corporations trust
them with everything-their livelihoods, their profits, and all or
nearly all of their money. Consequently, if banks falter or fail, depositors stand to lose everything. The stability of banks affects nearly
everyone in profound ways, and is therefore an important public
matter.5
The delicate interdependence of banks and depositors, and the
importance of that relationship to individuals and society as a whole,
has led to pervasive governmental regulation of the banking industry. 6 Although the regulatory landscape is continually changing, one
constant remains: the looming presence of the government overshadowing the industry. For over a century, the federal government has
restricted bank practices, 7 required certain levels of capital mainte4.
See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
History and Implications, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 33 (1992) (noting that deposit insurance
instills public confidence in the banking system).
5.
For scholarship advocating various approaches to ensuring bank stability, see Helen
A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?,50 Ohio St. L. J. 1159, 1195 (1989) (arguing against a
bank failure policy focused on more active regulation of unhealthy banks and favoring reform of
regulation of healthy banks); Jonathan R. Macey, The PoliticalScience of RegulatingBank Risk,
49 Ohio St. L. J. 1277, 1298 (1989) (arguing that effective reform of the bank regulation regime
will require either providing monetary incentives to regulators or privatizing the system).
6.
One of the most important regulatory schemes is, of course, the deposit insurance
system. Given our economic dependence on banks, the need for the system is clear. In theory,
in a world without deposit insurance, depositors would monitor the practices of the bank they
utilized. See Garten, 50 Ohio St. L. J. at 1180-81 (cited in note 5) (outlining the methods by
which depositors theoretically may discipline bank management). Depositors, however, may
neglect to monitor a bank that is engaging in risky practices as long as they are reasonably
confident regarding the bank's overall stability. In addition, their assessment of the bank's
soundness will often depend on whether fellow depositors are withdrawing their funds. Once a
substantial number of depositors begin withdrawing, it is too late for others to combat risktaking by management, for the bank's solvency is truly in peril. Id. at 1185. Finally, Professor
Peter Swire notes that most large bank failures are dealt with through a "purchase and assumption" transaction, which usually guarantees that even uninsured depositors' funds will
remain protected. Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now that it Matters Again, 42 Duke L.
J. 469, 514 (1992).
7.
Sections 24(7) and 377 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. at 162, prohibit commercial
banks from underwriting securities offerings or affiliating with organizations that engage in
underwriting. Furthermore, the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-607, 84 Stat. 1760, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994 ed.), generally forbid the
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nance,8 established special insolvency procedures,9 and imposed
liability on bank and thrift managers for abusive or fraudulent practices. 10
Modern governmental monitoring of the banking system began
during the Great Depression, after the breakdown of depositor confidence and the subsequent slew of devastating bank failures." In
response to the crisis, the government assumed a more influential
regulatory role to better protect depositors from the effects of bank
failures. 2 Thus was born the federal deposit insurance system. The
system, which is overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"), guarantees that depositors will be insured up
to $100,000 in the event of bank failure.'3 The vast majority of
affiliation of banks and nonbanks through a holding company. See note 50 and accompanying
text.
See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1995) ("Appendix A to Part 225-Capital Adequacy Guidelines for
8.
Bank Holding Companies: Risk-Based Measure").
9.
For instance, regulators may choose to keep a faltering bank open by providing
financial assistance, or may arrange the merger of a failed bank and a healthy one. 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994 ed.). Professor Swire observes that government regulators have
accumulated a "remarkable group of superpowers" for dealing with bank insolvency, equivalent
to a monopoly over insolvency procedures. Swire, 42 Duke L. J. at 481-82 (cited in note 6). For
a case challenging the exercise of insolvency powers as a violation of the Takings Clause, U.S.
Cost. Amend. V, see Golden PacificBancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
10. See Swire, 42 Duke L. J. at 485 (cited in note 6) (listing rules applying to bank insiders
found to be partially responsible for bank failures).
11. Banks had been subjected to regulation prior to the Great Depression. For example,
from the Civil War era until the Depression, shareholders of failed federal banks were not
entitled to limited liability, but were held liable for up to the par value of their shares "in addition to the amount invested in such shares." National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665,
668. Many states had parallel double liability provisions that applied to state-chartered banks.
In fact, by 1931, all but ten states had implemented double liability rules. Macey and Miller, 27
Wake Forest L. Rev. at 37 (cited in note 4). The two purposes of double liability were (1) to
ensure that the depositors-the creditors of the failed bank-received as much of their money
back as possible, and (2) to give the shareholders an incentive to monitor bank managers, in
order to decrease the probability that the bank would fail. Id. at 36 (citing Cong. Globe, 37th
Cong., 3d Sess. 824 (1863); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1069 (1864)).
The double liability system was pushed to its limits during the Great Depression, and was
finally abolished in 1933. Macey and Miller, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 37 (cited in note 4). The
downfall of the policy was due to the political backlash it received after the slew of bank failures
between 1929 and 1933. Id. The bank "runs" that occurred in rapid succession during this
period were the product of the breakdown of the delicate balance between banks and depositors.
Because depositors lost confidence in their banks, they wanted to retrieve their money. Because
banks did not keep enough capital in reserve to pay all of their depositors at once, they were
forced into insolvency. Depositors lost everything and the economy crashed. See id. at 38
(discussing the factors leading to double liability's elimination: "political resentment by bank
shareholders against assessment, the perception that double liability had failed as a regulatory
system, and the creation of a substitute regulatory system, [deposit insurance]").
12. See Macey and Miller, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 38 (stating that most people at the
time thought deposit insurance would be a far more effective guarantor of bank stability than
was double liability).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed.). Deposit insurance was established as a part of
the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994
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depositors are fully protected by the guarantee, and thus will suffer
no loss if their bank fails.14 The advent of federal deposit insurance
dramatically shifted the risk of bank failure: whereas previously the
shareholders and the depositors bore the risk, the new scheme placed
15
the risk almost entirely on the federal government.
The deposit insurance system was intended to be self-sufficient; that is, banks were charged a flat-rate premium to be pooled
into a single deposit insurance fund, and the money in the fund was
meant to be dispersed to depositors as needed. 16 An underlying assumption was that deposit insurance would ensure the stability of the
banking system by securing depositor confidence, and thus the insur17
ance fund would, most likely, never be depleted.
For fifty years, this assumption proved true. Bank failures
were few and far between, and the deposit insurance fund remained
solvent.'8 Then, in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the economic
and regulatory climate changed dramatically, bringing into focus the
major problems with the deposit insurance system.
One of these flaws, which recent legislative reforms have, in
part, attempted to address, is the moral hazard problem, which inheres in any insurance system. 19 The moral hazard problem lies at

ed.). See also Joint Resolution of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 435 (permanently implementing the
deposit insurance system).
14. According to the Treasury Department, approximately 75% of current bank deposits
are fully protected by the deposit insurance guarantee. See Department of the Treasury,
Modernizing the FinancialSystem: Recommendations for Safer, More CompetitiveBanks XVI-2
table 1 (1991).
15.
See Lissa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to
Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 935, 938
(1993) (arguing that recent legislative attempts to shift the risks of bank insolvency to shareholders are efficient and will reduce the overall probability of bank failure).
16. Until 1993, banks were charged 230 for every $100.00 of deposits accepted. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Proposed Rule Regarding Assessments, 57 Fed. Reg. 21617
(1992) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 327). Since 1993, premiums have been assessed based on the
capitalization of and the degree of concern regulators have over particular institutions. See id.
at 62503. The new system places additional risk on bank shareholders, who must pay for highrisk premiums.
17.
See Broome, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 942 (cited in note 15) ("Federal deposit insurance
is intended to ensure customer confidence in banks and thereby eliminate destabilizing runs on
troubled banks by their depositors").
18. From 1942 to 1980, an average of 4.8 insured banks were resolved each year by the
FDIC. FDIC, Annual Report 84 (1990).
19. See Swire, 42 Duke L. J. at 497 (cited in note 6) (stating that the "benefits of deposit
insurance have carried with them an increasing cost-the cost to the taxpayers of paying for
higher numbers of failures. One major source of these failures is 'moral hazard,' or the incentive for banks covered by insurance to act differently because of that insurance"); Howell E.
Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of FinancialHolding Companies, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 507,
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the other end of the spectrum from the problem of bank runs. With
no governmental protection, depositors have every incentive to ensure
that their banks do not engage in unduly risky practices, but the
transaction costs of such monitoring are too high to bear.20 With full
governmental protection, however, depositors have no reason to
monitor their banks. In addition, shareholders tend to favor risktaking so as to increase their potential dividends. There are no
effective agents of discipline to prevent bank management from
risking the solvency of the institution.21

The moral hazard problem was one of the underlying causes of
the recent crisis in the financial institution system.2 2 The savings and
23
loan crisis of the 1980s was marked by a wave of thrift failures.
Banks also failed in large numbers; as a result, the insurance funds
were rapidly depleted. 24 The thrift insurance fund was wiped out, and
Congress voted to appropriate funds to complete the bailout. 25 The

public grew increasingly outraged as taxpayer dollars were used to
564-68 (1994) (explaining how the moral hazard problem theoretically plays out in the bank
holding company context).
20. See Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 564 (cited in note 19) (stating that banks' debt
funding "comes from public claimants who are both too diffuse and too unsophisticated to
efficiently protect their interests"). But see Macey, 49 Ohio St. L. J. at 1280 (cited in note 5)
(arguing that deposit insurance eliminates depositors' incentive to protect against bank failure).
Professor Macey posits that, due to the extreme losses uninsured depositors would face in the
event of bank failure, they may be able to organize and monitor bank practices effectively. Id.
Assuming such organization is impossible, however, the high stakes involved lead to the bank
run phenomenon when depositors are uninsured. See id. at 1281 (describing the idea that
rational depositor behavior is to withdraw funds whenever a significant number of depositors
withdraw simultaneously). See also note 6.
21. See Broome, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 947 (cited in note 15) ('The result of [this)
insolvency risk distribution [scheme] is the creation of a 'moral hazard' associated with limited
liability and deposit insurance that encourages bank managers to undertake riskier activities
than would presumably otherwise be consistent with safe and sound operations"). See also
notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
22. See Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System at 8-9 (cited in
note 14) (discussing the decrease in market discipline caused by bank reliance on expanded
deposit insurance coverage rather than the strength of their own balance sheets).
23. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep.
No. 101-54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291, 303 (1989) (noting that in 1988, 754 thrifts were either
insolvent or "troubled," having less than 3% capital); The Thrift Institution Crisis and Its
Potential Impact on the Federal Budget, Hearings before the House Committee on the Budget,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (statement of Rep. Panetta, Dem.-Calif.).
24. More than 200 banks per year failed between 1987 and 1990. See Department of the
Treasury, Modernizing the FinancialSystem at 1-30 table 8 (cited in note 14). See also Stephen
Labaton, Bank DepositFund Nearly Insolvent, U.S. Auditor Says, N.Y. Times Al (Apr. 27, 1991)
(noting that many more banks were effectively bankrupt than regulators had previously
recognized, resulting in the fund's near insolvency).
25. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(8), 103 Stat. 183, 187, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994
ed.) (providing for "public and private sources to deal expeditiously with failed depository institutions"). FIRREA appropriated $164 billion for the bailout.
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salvage a system that was supposed to be self-supporting, and that
was failing because of the inadequacy of both public and private
discipline of management practices. 26 The President and Congress
looked for better ways to ensure the stability of the banking system,
and enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").27
FIRREA's related purposes are to promote the stability of
banks and their counterparts and to secure the solvency of the deposit
insurance fund. 28 To accomplish these objectives, the statute shifts
some of the risks of insolvency back to the shareholders of financial
29
institutions, and increases the obligations of the shareholders.
Perhaps the most controversial and far-reaching provision of FIRREA,
and the one that this Note will analyze, is known as the "crossguarantee" power.
The cross-guarantee is narrow in that it does not apply to all
financial institutions, but applies only to "commonly controlled insured depository institutions"--affiliates of bank holding companies. 30
On the other hand, it is relatively broad in that it essentially eliminates limited liability for those affiliates. The cross-guarantee provides that, in the event the FDIC must financially assist any member
of a bank holding company, all of the other affiliates are liable for the
cost incurred by the FDIC.31 Essentially, the cross-guarantee serves
as a risk-shifting mechanism: whereas before the federal government
26. Public and congressional indignation about the savings and loan debacle continued
even after FIRREA was passed in an attempt to reform the system. See 136 Cong. Rec. S1774849 (Oct. 2, 1990) ("It is outrageous that taxpayers are being asked to pay billions of dollars to
clean up the S&L mess. It would be even worse if we did not try our best to prevent a similar
crisis at the FDIC) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg, Dem.-N.J.).
27. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994 ed.).
Three other major pieces of reform legislation were also enacted: the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552, codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1994 ed.); the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 478, codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C. (1994 ed.); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 ('FIDICIA), Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994 ed.).
28. FIRREA §§ 101(2)-(5), 103 Stat. at 187.
29. See, for example, L. William Seidman, Testimony on the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 in Thrift Mergersand AcquisitionsAfter FIRREA
Including Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Thrifts 818, 837 (Practicing Law Inst., 1990)
(noting that the cross-guarantee "was designed to keep multi-institution holding companies
from abandoning failing insured affiliates').
30. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(1)(A) (1994 ed.) (establishing liability of commonly controlled
depository institutions for losses or anticipated losses of the FDIC). Thus, if Bank A and Bank
B are controlled by the same holding company, Bank B may be assessed for the cost of an FDIC
bailout if Bank A fails or approaches default.
31. Id. § 1815(e).
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bore the entire risk of an affiliate's insolvency, that risk is now shared
by the shareholders of the siblings of that affiliate.32 The crossguarantee is intended to fulfill the goals of FIRREA by increasing
shareholder discipline over holding company management so as to
prevent failure, while simultaneously ensuring the solvency of the
deposit insurance fund by forcing shareholders to reimburse the FDIC
for its losses. 3
Implementation of the cross-guarantee power has potentially
drastic effects on bank holding companies. The failure of one holding
company member may drive the other members into insolvency as
each is assessed for the failure of the others. Consequently, all of the
shareholders of a holding company may lose their investments due to
the failure of just one affiliate.34 Because of this dramatic impact, the
cross-guarantee has recently been challenged on constitutional
grounds. Critics of the provision argue that forcing affiliates to pay
for the debts of other corporations effects a fifth amendment taking
without just compensation. 35 Because holding company shareholders
relied on the notion of limited liability when they invested, and
because cross-guarantee assessments may destroy the entire value of
their shares, the use of the cross-guarantee power alters their
property rights so drastically that it constitutes a taking. Those who
have been assessed under the cross-guarantee provision should
therefore be compensated for their losses.36
32. See Broome, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 960-63 (cited in note 15) (analyzing the crossguarantee's effect on the risks shareholders face in the event of bank holding company affiliate
failure). See also notes 89-93 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth illustration of the
cross-guarantee's operation).
33. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statement of Policy Regarding Liability of
Commonly Controlled Depository Institutions, 55 Fed. Reg. 21934, 21935 (1990). See H.R. Rep.
101-54 at 325 (cited in note 23) ("Each [commonly controlled] financial institution must reimburse the FDIC ... for any loss the FDIC may incur in connection with the failure of or assisSee also notes 87-88 and
tance to a commonly owned insured financial institution").
accompanying text.
34. See Jennifer B. Arlin, Note, Of Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment: FIRREA's
Cross-GuaranteeReexamined, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 293, 307-311 (1991) (explaining the
potential consequences of exercise of the cross-guarantee power, and describing the impact of
the provisions utilization in connection with the failure of the Bank of New England). See text
accompanying note 98 (explaining the cross-guarantee's potential impact); notes 232-42
(describing the Bank of New England case).
35. See U.S. Const. Amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
36. See Branch on Behalf of Maine Natl. Bank v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 626, 637 (1994)
(finding the cross-guarantee unconstitutional), certified for appeal, 42 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
18, 1994). But see Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding the cross-guarantee constitutional); Broome, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 988-89 (cited in
note 15) (concluding that the exercise of the cross-guarantee is constitutional). See also
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Law and Regulation at 657 (Little, Brown,
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Two cases alleging that the cross-guarantee effects a taking
have recently come before the lower federal courts. In Meriden Trust
and Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC,37 the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut upheld the cross-guarantee as constitu38
tional. In Branch on Behalf of Maine Natl. Bank v. United States,
however, the Court of Federal Claims found the cross-guarantee to
constitute a taking without just compensation.3 9 Meriden has been
affirmed by the Second Circuit;40 Branch has been certified for appeal
in the Federal Circuit. 41
The ultimate decision regarding the
constitutionality of the cross-guarantee will have tremendous
import.42 If the cross-guarantee is found to effect a taking, the federal
government will be forced to pay millions of dollars of compensation to
shareholders; the probable effect will be to force the government to
eliminate the cross-guarantee altogether and to look for an
alternative policy. 43 On the other hand, if the measure is upheld, the
shareholders of bank holding company affiliates face dramatic risks of
liability. Whichever way the issue is decided will have lasting effects
44
on financial institution reformers, shareholders, and taxpayers.
This Note examines the constitutionality of the cross-guarantee power and concludes that the provision does not effect a taking
without just compensation. Part II discusses the regulatory scheme
governing bank holding companies and describes the cross-guarantee's purposes, provisions, and impact on that regulatory scheme.

1992) (asking how "the federal government [can] simply insert itself in the priority hierarchy

above existing interests without the payment of just compensation"); David A. Segal, Note, A
Note to Congress and the FDIC: After FIRREA Where's the BIF?, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 411, 451
(1991) (noting that the cross-guarantee may be open to constitutional challenge, but that it is
unclear what level of scrutiny would apply).
37. 868 F. Supp. 29 (D. Conn. 1994), affd, 62 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 1995).
38. 31 Fed. Cl. 626 (1994), certified for appeal, 42 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 1994).
39. Id. at. 637 (holding that, unless the trial court finds that the individual banks within a
holding company have ignored separate corporate form, it cannot constitutionally uphold a
cross-guarantee assessment of any of those banks).
40. 62 F.3d at 449.
41. 42 F.3d at 1409.
42. The cross-guarantee's failure, either as a policy or on constitutional grounds, is an
important concern for taxpayers, who stand to lose billions of dollars if the deposit insurance
system breaks down.
43. See Howard N. Cayne, Richard M. Alexander and Brian E. J. Lam, Federal Courts
DisagreeOver Constitutionalityof FIRREA Cross-Guarantees,13 Banking Policy Rep. 4, 6 (Nov.
7, 1994) (noting that Branch represents a major setback in regulatory attempts to hold financial
holding companies responsible for the FDIC's losses).
44. Because of Branch'simportance, the FDIC will almost certainly appeal the case to the
Supreme Court if necessary. Id.; Nicholas Zeppos, Developments in Administrative Law 50
(draft 1995) (on file with the Author).
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Part III provides an overview of takings jurisprudence, describing the
current analyses the Supreme Court utilizes and recent trends in the
law.
Part IV describes the facts and dispositions of the Meriden and
Branch cases. Part V analyzes whether the cross-guarantee violates
the Takings Clause, using the recent cases as a point of departure. It
first looks at the investment-backed expectations of affliate bank
shareholders, and then measures the economic impact of the crossguarantee on those shareholders. It concludes that the measure does
not defeat reasonable expectations so radically, and does not affect
property rights so adversely, as to require governmental
compensation. Part V also considers the efficacy of the crossguarantee as an economic policy. It argues that the cross-guarantee
is not only a legitimate policy measure, but also one of the best ways
to redistribute the risks of bank failure so as to ensure the stability of
the banking system and the solvency of the deposit insurance fund.
The efficacy of the cross-guarantee is strong enough to outweigh and
therefore justify the economic burdens placed upon bank holding
company shareholders.
II. THE REGULATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE CROSSGUARANTEE'S IMPACT

Before FIRREA was enacted, bank holding companies, like
other financial institutions, faced a formidable set of rules and restrictions governing their operations. 45 This Part describes this general regulatory scheme.
A. The General Regulatory Landscape Governing Holding Companies
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA") 46 is the
primary source of rules regarding the creation and activities of
holding companies. 47 Bank holding companies require governmental
45. See Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 510-11 (cited in note 19) (discussing the increasing
regulation of financial holding companies over the past twenty years).
46. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1994 ed.).
47. In essence, a bank holding company is a company that substantially controls the
management, activities, and, most importantly, the capital of another bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841.
"Contror may be established in one of three ways: (1) ownership, control, or power to vote on
25% of the voting shares of the bank, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A), (2) control over the election of a
majority of the directors or trustees of such bank, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(B), or (3) a determination of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that the company exerts a
"controlling influence over such bank's management or policies," 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(C).
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approval for their very existence. 48 According to the BHCA, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board") must preapprove any action causing a company to become a holding company
or a subsidiary of a holding company; such institutions must formally
apply to the Board to receive holding company status.49 Additionally,
the BHCA restricts the activities of bank holding companies. Except
for limited exemptions, such entities are prohibited from owning or
controlling voting shares in any company that is not a bank. 50 In
other words, bank holding companies are essentially restricted to the
business of banking and related ventures.
One purpose behind these rules is to prevent holding companies from abusing the deposit insurance system.5 1 Because the structure of the holding company allows it to shift capital and assets from
one entity to another, and because so great a percentage of bank
deposits are controlled by banks that are affiliates of bank holding

48. Id. § 1842(a).
49. Id. The factors the Board considers are: (1) the financial resources and soundness of
the applicant institution, (2) whether the proposed holding company formation would tend to
lessen competition or create a monopoly, and (3) the needs of the community. Id. § 1842(c).
Importantly, any bank that is either a holding company or an affiliate of such a company must
be federally insured. Id. § 1842(e). See notes 211-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Meriden.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1). The most important exception to this prohibition provides that
bank holding companies may acquire businesses "the activities of which the Board after due
notice and opportunity for hearing has determined... to be so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." Id. § 1843(c)(8)(ii). Although
this exemption is broad in the sense that bank holding companies potentially can acquire
interests in numerous nonbank activities, it is important to note that the Board must preapprove such acquisitions. Id. The intent is to give regulators the ability to monitor and control
bank holding company expansion. See Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1354 n.58 (cited in note 1)
(discussing the factors the Board considers in deciding whether to allow a nonbank acquisition).
51. The BHCA's stated purposes are "to control the [accumulation] of banking assets
within a single corporate entity" and to monitor the combination of bank and nonbank activities
in a bank holding company. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, S. Rep. No. 911084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). With regard to the required separation of bank and
nonbank activities, the fear is that holding companies will acquire nonbank enterprises, and
then divert assets from the affiliates that are banks to those that are not, or engage in
transactions harmful to the bank but favorable to the nonbank affiliate. If the bank affiliates
fail because of these practices, its depositors will be reimbursed through the deposit insurance
system, while the holding company will make huge profits from the activities of the nonbank
affiliates. See Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 565 (cited in note 19) ("[T]he assumption seems to
be that holding companies are also apt to possess controlling interests in unregulated entities
and that the holding companies might be inclined to exploit their influence over regulated
subsidiaries to favor those unregulated affiliates"). See also notes 58-60 and accompanying text
(explaining the incentive holding companies have, with the security of deposit insurance, to
exploit and then abandon their failing bank affiliates for the benefit of healthy affiliates).
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companies, 52 the government perceives a public need to prevent bank
holding companies from exploiting the deposit insurance system to
the detriment of the FDIC.
B. Specific Regulatory Efforts to Control the Moral HazardProblem
As previously mentioned, the moral hazard problem substantially weakens the stability of federally insured banks and bank holding companies. There are two aspects to the problem. First, an
inherent problem exists due to the security of deposit insurance,
53
leading to a dearth of depositor discipline over management.
Second, the moral hazard is exacerbated by the principle of limited
liability, which leads to an inadequacy of shareholder discipline over
management.54 In addition to the BHCA's general control over bank
holding company status and activities, there have been specific legislative and regulatory attenipts to deal with these related problems.
The moral hazard problem is not unique to the deposit insurance system, but is inherent in the insurance relationship. 55 The
basic problem may be described as follows: if one is insured against a
certain type of adversity, and will be compensated if befallen by that
adversity, one has far less incentive to avoid the risk of that adversity.
For instance, the moral hazard theory would suggest that someone
with fire insurance will be less careful about smoking in bed, installing smoke detectors, etc., because she will be compensated if a fire
breaks out. Depositors likewise have little incentive to ensure that
the institution in which their funds are kept remains solvent because
most depositors are guaranteed full reimbursement in the event of
failure. 56
52. As of December 1988, the 6,474 bank holding companies controlled 91% of the assets
of all commercial banks. See Pauline B. Heller, Federal Bank Holding Company Law xx (Law
Journal Seminars, 1995).
53. See Garten, 50 Ohio St. L. J. at 1186 (cited in note 5) ("Mhe principal hazard created
by deposit insurance should be the willingness of insured depositors to continue to fund banks
that are excessively risky or mismanaged").
54. See id. at 1176-87 (discussing in-depth the incentives of shareholders and depositors to
discipline bank management).
55. For a general discussion of the moral hazard problem, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, An
Introductionto Law and Economics 56-58 (Little, Brown, 1989).
56. On the other side of the coin, Professor Broome argues that bank management has a
major incentive to take enhanced risks in order to reap the benefits that insurance provides.
Broome, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 949-50 (cited in note 15). Professor Broome states that, in the
absence of deposit insurance, a bank must pay for the riskiness of its activities; if a bank is
nearing insolvency because of undue risk-taking, the cost of attracting and keeping depositors
will increase, because the depositors will become more and more insecure about losing their
money. Id. at 950. The only way to take advantage of the "subsidy" that deposit insurance
provides, then, is for management to increase the risks taken. Id. See also Department of the
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The moral hazard problem is augmented by the principle of
limited liability. Although shareholders stand to lose their investment if the bank fails, and will thus exert some discipline over management, the shareholders will gain a great deal if the bank's profits
skyrocket. Therefore, there is little for shareholders to lose, but much
to gain if the bank takes large risks. Moreover, the encouragement of
risk-taking will increase as a bank nears insolvency; because the
shareholders are not liable if the bank loses big, they have nothing to
lose by gambling with the bank's funds.97
The moral hazard problem is further exacerbated by the holding company structure. 58 Because capital and control are concentrated in a single corporate shareholder, that shareholder has the
incentive and the ability to increase the riskiness of its insured
subsidiaries in order to increase its profitability. It may ask insured
subsidiaries to pay excessive dividends, exact unduly high
management fees, or engage in other illicit practices, while the FDIC
bears the risk of failure. 59 In addition, holding companies are prone to
"abandon" a bank subsidiary that is nearing insolvency by shifting
that subsidiary's assets to healthy subsidiaries and letting the FDIC
bear the loss when the ailing subsidiary fails. 60 The "safety net" of
Treasury, Modernizing the FinancialSystem at 1-12 (cited in note 14) (discussing how deposit
insurance eliminates any penalty bank management would normally face for risk-taking). Note,
however, that despite the lack of discipline asserted by shareholders and depositors, bank
management has some incentive to avoid excessive risk-taking so as to keep their jobs, which
they would most likely lose in the event of insolvency. Id. at 1-42. See also Part V.B.3 (arguing
that the cross-guarantee may induce management to reduce holding company risk-taking).
57. "Heads the bank wins, tails the FDIC loses." Department of the Treasury,
Modernizing the FinancialSystem at 1-13 (cited in note 14).
58. Professor Jackson describes the "hungry wolf" justification for increasing the obligations of holding companies:
One way that the holding company structure might compound the moral hazard problem
common to all financial intermediaries is by providing a vehicle through which equity
ownership, which is otherwise dispersed among many shareholders, can become concentrated and impose on regulated subsidiaries more risky business strategies than management would otherwise pursue. Under this view, the significance of holding company
ownership is that it provides dispersed shareholders with a mechanism for influencing
regulated entities that is not available when shareholders own those entities directly.
Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 566 (cited in note 19).
59. See id. at 565 (explaining that "moral hazard problems common to all financial institutions are exacerbated when a single corporate shareholder who is well-situated to exploit the
moral hazard controls the entire equity interest of a financial institution"); Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 1383 (cited in note 1) (noting that the above-described problem was one of the justifications for the source-of-strength doctrine).
60. See Basis for Fed's "Source-of-Strength" Policy Is Questionable, Breeden Says, 49
Banking Report (BNA) 541, 541-42 (Sept. 21, 1987) (quoting the assertion of the Board's General
Counsel, Michael Bradfield, that a bank holding company "can't mismanage an institution,
[allow it to] have inadequate capital, and walk away from that bank"). See also notes 88-98 and
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deposit insurance encourages the abuse of asset-shifting capabilities
to the detriment of the FDIC and, eventually, the taxpayers.
The problems described above have received a great deal of
legislative and regulatory attention in the past. Many of the measures enacted have attempted, in one way or another, to provide discipline through increasing the liabilities of shareholders and management and increasing the enforcement authority of government regulators.61 The legislative efforts to combat the moral hazard problem

help explain the cross-guarantee's enactment. In addition, they illustrate the general type of regulatory regime to which bank holding
2
company shareholders subject themselves when they invest.6
1. The Double Liability System: Deviating from Traditional
Corporate Law
Since the nineteenth century, the liability of most corporate
shareholders has been limited to the amount invested in the
corporation.6 3 Except in limited circumstances," such shareholders
accompanying text (describing how the cross-guarantee is intended to remedy the moral hazard
problem unique to bank holding companies).
61. See Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 514-39 (cited in note 19) (describing the evolution of
financial holding company regulation and the increasing obligations such companies face, and
arguing that most of these regulations are "aimed at insulating regulated subsidiaries from
holding company abuse'. For close to twenty years, thrift regulators insisted that thrift holding
companies guarantee, at least to some degree, the solvency of their subsidiaries. Id. at 519.
This policy was relaxed by regulators in 1988. Id. at 521-22. About the same time, in the
banking industry, the FDIC modified its policy with regard to the closure of failed holding
company affiliates. It accorded lower priority to loans made by solvent affiliates to insolvent
affiliates than it did to other unsecured creditors of the failed affiliates; in this manner, the
FDIC shifted some of its resolution costs to holding company affiliates, and thereby to the
holding companies themselves. Id. at 534-35.
These regulatory initiatives, along with the double-liability scheme and the source-ofstrength doctrine discussed below, demonstrate that the practices and stability of bank holding
company enterprises have been of primary concern to regulators. See notes 45-52 and accompanying text (noting that the general regulatory regime governing bank holding companies is in
part directed at preventing and controlling abuses). These measures were similar, in purpose
and method, to the cross-guarantee. See notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
62. The nature of the regulatory scheme at the time of investment affects the evaluation
of an investor's claim that a particular regulation deviates so sharply from that scheme as to
effect an unconstitutional taking. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2899, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992) (stating that takings analysis is guided by the expectations of
investors as to the rights they acquire when they invest).
63. See Model Business Corporation Act §§ 6, 22 (ABA, 1969). See also Larry D.
Soderquist and A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporations41 (Michie, 3d ed. 1991) (citing limited liability
as the most important advantage of organizing a business in the corporate form).
It is significant that, although limited liability has gained an almost revered status in corporate law, see id. at 7 (quoting former Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler:

"the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times"), it has never
been accorded the status of a constitutional right. Instead, the rule is statutory in origin,
suggesting that legislatures may eradicate or diminish it with impunity. See Zeppos,
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are not held responsible for the debts of the corporation that they
own. In contrast, until the Great Depression and the introduction of
deposit insurance, many American bank shareholders were subject to
"double liability" in the event of failure. 65 If a bank or bank holding
company failed, its shareholders were liable for up to the par value of
their shares.66 Legislators replaced double liability with deposit
insurance, believing that insurance would protect depositors from
bank failure more fully than had the limited market discipline

Developments in Administrative Law at 52-54 (cited in note 44) ("Legislative in origin are these
rights and particularly with bank shareholders Congress and the states have over the years felt
free to change the rules of the game").
Moreover, for much of the time that limited liability has automatically been granted to most
corporate shareholders, bank and bank holding company shareholders have been denied that
privilege. See Macey and Miller, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 31 (cited in note 4) ("For three
quarters of a century-between, roughly, the Civil War and the Great Depression-shareholders
in American banks were responsible not only for their investments, but also for a portion of the
bank's debts after insolvency"). Limited liability, then, is far from an absolute right of bank
holding company shareholders. See Part V.A (arguing that bank holding company shareholders
have, at most, only a qualified expectation of limited liability).
64. Although limited liability is the general rule, courts will "pierce the corporate veil" and
hold shareholders liable for corporate debts under certain limited circumstances.
See
Soderquist and Sommer, Corporations at 143-60 (cited in note 63) (examining a number of
factual scenarios in which courts pierce the corporate veil). In the context of a multi-corporate
enterprise, such as a bank holding company, additional grounds for piercing are commonly
cited. As Professors Soderquist and Sommers state:
Usual problems that may lead to piercing are (1) failing properly to approve and document intercorporate transactions, (2) treating multiple corporations as if they were one
business, and (3) setting up contractual arrangements that favor one corporation at the
expense of another.
Id. at 155. This Note contends that bank holding companies, by virtue of their structure and the
security of deposit insurance, are uniquely positioned to engage in these practices. The crossguarantee, accordingly, is justifiable as a "presumptive" piercing mechanism. See Part V.A.
65. See note 11. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944), upheld the imposition of double
liability on bank holding companies. The Court noted that, if double liability were imposed on
independent banks but not on holding companies, it would be far too easy for shareholders to
circumvent liability simply by creating a holding company. Id. at 359. The Court would not
allow the important statutory policy underlying double liability to be defeated by excusing
holding companies from responsibility. Id. at 362-63.
The import of Anderson is that it represents an early recognition of the Court that limited
liability in the holding company context is not a sacrosanct principle and may be eliminated
"when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or
upheld." Id. at 362 (citation omitted). Investors in holding companies should be aware at the
time they invest that both regulators and courts have supported the imposition of added liabilities to ensure stability and prevent abuse. See Part V.A.
66. National Banking Act of 1863 § 12, 12 Stat. at 668. The double liability system was,
intended, in part, to deal with the lack of adequate shareholder discipline over management.
Greater liability would encourage shareholders to monitor management more carefully. See
Macey and Miller, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 33 (cited in note 4) (stating that double liability
transforms shareholders into investors who are better served by decreased risk-taking by
management). See also note 11.
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provided by double liability. 67 Certainly deposit insurance resulted in
protected depositors, as it placed nearly the entire risk of failure on
the government. The moral hazard problem, however, was an
inevitable result of the implementation of the deposit insurance
6
system. 8
Double liability represented a deviation from the traditional
statutory right to limited liability enjoyed by other corporate shareholders. Its existence illustrates that banks have always been treated
differently by the government; potential investors should be on notice
of this tendency.
2. The Source-of-Strength Doctrine
Another regulatory measure intended, in part, to combat the
deleterious effects of the moral hazard problem in bank holding companies was the source-of-strength doctrine.69 In the spring of 1987,
the Federal Reserve Board issued a policy statement declaring that
bank holding companies have a continuing obligation to maintain
financial strength at the holding company level and to provide fmancial support to subsidiaries in times of trouble70 Failure to comply
67. Deposit insurance was originally implemented in the Banking Act of 1933 § 12B, 48
Stat. at 168. For a discussion of the political reasons for the termination of double liability, see
note 11.
68. Indeed, Professors Macey and Miller advocate reexamination of the double liability
system, arguing that it may well be a more effective method of ensuring bank stability than is
deposit insurance. Macey and Miller, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 33-35 (cited in note 4). They
argue that the moral hazard created by deposit insurance leads to more bank failures overall.
Id. On the other hand, because the prospect of added liability in the event of failure encourages
shareholders to favor more conservative bank practices, banks would be less likely to drive
themselves into insolvency due to excessive risk-taking under a double liability system. Id.
Professors Macey and Miller cite historical evidence proving the overall effectiveness of the
double liability system. Id. See Part II.C.2 (discussing similar arguments supporting the crossguarantee).
69. For a thorough analysis of the source-of-strength doctrine, see Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 1344 (cited in note 1). See also James F. Groth, Comment, Can Regulators Force Bank
Holding Companiesto Bail Out Their FailingSubsidiaries?-An Analysis of the FederalReserve
Board'sSource-of-Strength Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 112 (1991).
70. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement; Responsibility of
Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg.
15707 (1987). The Board's 1987 policy statement was actually a reiteration of what it termed its
"fundamental and long-standinge' policy requiring bank holding companies to support and recapitalize troubled subsidiaries. Id. See Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1367-72 (cited in note 1)
(discussing the history of the source-of-strength doctrine). The Board issued the policy statement in response to the matter of Hawkeye Bancorp, a bank holding company which refused to
follow the Board's order to inject $1.2 million into a failing subsidiary, leading to the affiliate's
closure. Id. at 1369. The statement clarified bank holding company obligations under the
source-of-strength doctrine:
[I]n serving as a source of strength to its subsidiary, a bank holding company should
stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds to its subsidiary
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with this obligation "could result in Board enforcement actions, ceaseand-desist orders, civil money damages, and other regulatory
penalties."171

In essence, the source-of-strength doctrine was an ex ante
elimination of limited liability: the gist of the measure was that holding companies would be penalized unless they took responsibility for
the financial stability of other corporations, namely, their subsidiaries.72 The Fifth Circuit invalidated the doctrine in 1990, however, as
73
exceeding the Board's statutory authority.

banks during periods of financial stress or adversity and should maintain the financial
flexibility and capital raising capacity to obtain additional resources for assisting subsidiary banks.
52 Fed. Reg. at 15707.
71. See Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1370 (cited in note 1).
72. See id. at 1381 ('CThe essence of this theory is that federal regulators need the power to
pierce the veil between a bank subsidiary and the [bank holding company] and to force the
[bank holding company) to inject capital into the bank, otherwise a [bank holding company] will
be tempted to let a troubled insured bank fail and shift the costs of rescuing the bank to the
FDIC and, eventually, the taxpayer).
73. MCorp Financial,Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 900 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd in relevant part, 502 U.S. 32 (1991). In MCorp, a bank holding
company was charged under BHCA with engaging in "unsafe and unsound" practices,
considered "likely to cause substantial dissipation of the assets of MCorp that could be used to
allow MCorp to serve as a source of financial strength for the subsidiary Banks." Id. at 853.
The Federal Reserve Board then ordered the holding company to recapitalize those subsidiary
banks that were experiencing trouble; MCorp's subsidiaries had been weakened due to losses on
real estate and energy loans. Id. at 853-54. In March of 1989, the Comptroller of the Currency
declared insolvent twenty of MCorp's twenty-five subsidiaries, and placed them in receivership.
Id. at 853-54. The Board then charged the holding company with failing to act as a source of
strength for its subsidiaries. Id. at 854.
The Fifth Circuit found that the Board's issuance of the source-of-strength regulation
exceeded its statutory authority under the BHCA. Id. at 860-62. Although the court conceded
that the Board could condition its approval of a holding company application on a guarantee
that the company would maintain the financial soundness of its subsidiaries, id. at 862 n.5, it
nevertheless held that the BHCA's "unsafe and unsound practices" provision did not authorize
the Board to use source-of-strength doctrine after approval, id. at 863. The implication of this
decision was to invalidate a regulatory tool that could combat the moral hazard problem and
prevent further bank failures and depletion of the deposit insurance fund. See Petition for
Certiorari 17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial,Inc., 502
U.S. 32 (1991) (arguing that, without the source-of-strength doctrine, there is an "incentive for
holding companies to maximize the short-term, cyclical profits of their subsidiary banks, regardless of risk, because the bank insurance fund-not the parent holding companies-would
ultimately bear the costs if the subsidiaries later fail').
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision holding that the court did
not have the jurisdiction to enjoin the Board. MCorp Financial,502 U.S. at 32. The Court did
not reach the statutory authority question. Id. at 35 n.6.
The Board received some additional relief from Congress through the adoption of FIDICIA,
105 Stat. at 2236. Under this statute, the Board retains limited source-of-strength powers,
including the authority to force a failing holding company subsidiary to adopt a recapitalization
plan to which the holding company must guarantee compliance. Id. § 131(e)(2), 105 Stat. at
2256-57. In sum, bank holding company shareholders have been almost continuously subjected
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The common thread between the double liability system and
the source-of-strength doctrine is the way the government attacked
the moral hazard problem. Instead of targeting the depositor-creditors of the bank holding company by restricting or reducing insurance,
these regulations either increased the liabilities of shareholders,
increased the enforcement authority of regulators, or both.
Two themes emerge from this discussion. First, anyone investing in a bank holding company should be aware of the legislative and
administrative attention such structures receive and of the magnitude
of the government's control over them. Second, considering the
objectives and types of prior regulation, the enactment of the crossguarantee should have come as no surprise to investors.
C. The Cross-Guarantee
FIRREA, which included the cross-guarantee power, was
passed during a literal disaster-in-progress in the financial institutions industry. 74 As before, the reforms enacted, including the crossguarantee, were intended to control the moral hazard problem, and
the drain on the insurance fund it causes, by imposing added liabilities on shareholders and management, and by increasing regulatory
enforcement powers.
1. Background
The increases in the failures of financial institutions in the
1980s were dramatic. Whereas between 1943 and 1974 fewer than
ten banks failed in any given year,75 more than 200 failed each year
between 1987 and 1990. 7 6 Many experts believed the crisis to be the
77
worst since the Great Depression.

to some variation of the source-of-strength doctrine. See Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1377-80
(cited in note 1) (detailing the Supreme Court's and Congress's responses to the MCorp
decision).
74. See, for example, H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 302 (cited in note 23) ("The nation's thrift
industry and its deposit insurance fund, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,
are currently in precarious financial condition and consumer confidence in the savings and loan
industry is waning").
75. FDIC, Annual Report 61 (1988).
76. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the FinancialSystem at 1-30 table 8 (cited
in note 14).
77. See Deposit Insurance Reform and Financial Modernization, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990)
(statement of Robert N. Downey, Chairman, Securities Industries Association) ('The crises
surrounding our federally insured thrifts will be with us for quite some time. We all... have an
interest in extricating this country from this mess).
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The moral hazard problem of deposit insurance facilitated
many of the abuses that caused the crisis." The Reagan administration's implementation of limited-enforcement policies and deregulation left the industry without adequate governmental supervision,
further exacerbating the problem.79 These factors facilitated unwarranted risk-taking, abuse, and fraudulent practices by bank managers, which in turn increased the numbers of failures. 80
78. FIRREA's legislative history provides a detailed analysis of the causes of the savings
and loan crisis and sheds some light on the perceived need for reforms such as the cross-guarantee. The analysis cites poor management, fraud, and abuse as important causes of the crisis:
We found that extensive and repeated violations of laws and regulations characterized
the 26 failed thrifts we reviewed. Virtually every one of the thrifts was operating in an
unsafe and unsound manner and was exposed to risks far beyond what was prudent.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 300 (cited in note 23) (citation omitted). The House Report discusses
how management engaged in rapid growth schemes, risky investment strategies, and extravagant spending, and relates regulators' conclusion that nearly 40% of thrift failures were caused
by some form of fraud or insider abuse. Id. See also Swire, 42 Duke L. J. at 510-11 (cited in
note 6). Professor Swire argues that it is relatively easy for bank insiders to commit fraud upon
their banks because "[banking involves transactions that are (1) numerous, (2) in highly liquid
form, (3) easily forgeable, and (4) involve large amounts of money which (5) often cross jurisdictional boundaries." Id. at 510. Such factors make it difficult for either shareholders or regulators to detect wrongful or highly risky strategies. Id. See also note 325 and accompanying text
(arguing that the difficulty of and costs involved in discovering fraud or undue risk-taking make
across-the-board measures like the cross-guarantee more efficient to enforce than are measures
aimed at individual wrongdoers).
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 300-01 (cited in note 23) ("Because of the Administration's
lack of support for tough regulation and supervision of high-flying and risk-laden thrifts, the
FSLIC was unable to attract an adequate examination force at a critical time. Without adequate supervision, thrifts were free to engage in fraudulent and risky activities, often at the
expense of the FSLIC').
80. Id. at 295-300. In addition to the abuses described above, there were several other
articulable causes of the market breakdown. First, technological advances and new forms of
competition combined to decrease the traditional market for commercial banks. Second, the
economic climate of the time weakened the banks' stability.
Banks have historically had a well-established market due to the prohibitive transaction
costs of entering the business. See Fallon, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1345 (cited in note 1). Banks
were considered to be the most efficient channelers of capital because they could afford to pay
the high transaction costs of obtaining financial and credit information. Those seeking to
borrow or deposit capital relied on banks to gather and use that information. In this manner,
banks secured for themselves a niche in the market. See id.
This niche, however, was diminished due to new advances in computer and telecommunications technology, which enabled non-bank actors to gain the information they needed relatively
cheaply. Id. Because these innovations reduced the transaction costs of borrowing and lending,
those who purchased and sold the use of capital were increasingly able to sidestep banks and
deal with each other directly. Id. Banks were also plagued by new forms of competition. Along
with institutionalized savings competitors such as money-market accounts, other capital sources
emerged that eroded commercial bank markets, including foreign banks, the Eurodollar
markets, and corporate lenders such as General Electric Capital Corporation. Id. at 1345-46.
Additionally, the prevailing economic conditions of the period precipitated a general trend
toward bank failure. Record interest rates and inflation during the late 1970s and early 1980s
pushed up the costs of obtaining depositors. Arlin, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 301 (cited in note
34). The crash of the New England real estate market, as well as adverse conditions in
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The slew of bank failures placed great strain on the FDIC. The
FDIC experienced its first ever net operating loss in 1988, and, by
mid-1990, the Bank Insurance Fund ('BIF") had been depleted to
$11.4 billion, approximately six-tenths of one percent of all insured
deposits, half the percentage it contained five years earlier.81 Even
more dramatic was the breakdown in the savings and loan industry,
which completely devastated the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation's (FSLIC") reserves. Waves of savings and loans failed
in the early 1980s; in 1982 alone, the numbers equaled seven percent
of all FSLIC-insured institutions.8 2 As the FSLIC was forced to
reimburse more and more savings and loan depositors, its funds were
rapidly depleted; the amounts owed to depositors eventually exceeded
the fund's capabilities by billions of dollars. 83 Congress was finally
forced to complete the bailout with taxpayer money, and public and
legislative outrage was the predictable result.&
The government responded to these events by reevaluating the
regulatory scheme governing financial institutions, in hopes that
changes could be made to strengthen the industry's stability and to
ensure that the deposit insurance system would remain viable. In
February of 1989, President Bush proposed FIRREA, announcing his
intent to reform the savings and loan industry so that financially
troubled institutions could be dealt with more effectively and
promptly.85 The proposal passed through both houses of Congress
rapidly, and FIRREA was signed into law on August 9, 1989.86
2. Purposes, Provisions, and Implications of the Cross-Guarantee
FIRREA's stated purposes are to reform and recapitalize the
deposit insurance system, to strengthen the regulatory enforcement
industries such as oil production, agriculture, and loans to developing nations, disabled some
borrowers from making timely payments, further weakening financial institutions. Id.
81. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board Briefing: Bank Insurance Fund
Mid Year Results 2 (1990).
82. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Thrifts Under Siege: Restoring Order to American Banking
40 (Ballinger, 1988).
83. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 304 (cited in note 23) (reporting that, for example, the
FSLIC lost $8.5 billion in 1987 and approximately $40 billion in 1988, and that the FSLIC was
in a combined deficit position of more than $56 billion as of the end of 1988).
84. See note 26 (noting congressional indignance at the publicly funded bailout of many of
the nation's thrifts).
85. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 304 (cited in note 23) (quoting President Bush: "I have
decided to attack this problem head-on, with every available resource of our government
because it is a national problem. I have directed that the combined resources of the federal
agencies be brought together in a team effort to resolve the problem").
86. 103 Stat. at 553.
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powers of the FDIC and related entities, and to increase the criminal
and civil sanctions for fraud and abuse. 87 The cross-guarantee is intended to achieve the first objective-to restore and maintain the
solvency of the deposit insurance fund. 88 As discussed above, depletion of insurance funds is directly caused by the two-pronged moral
hazard problem, which encourages exploitation of the insurance system, and which is compounded in the holding company structure.
Therefore, like the regulatory measures that preceded it, the crossguarantee represents an attempt to control the moral hazard problem.
It achieves this objective by imposing added liabilities on shareholders.
The cross-guarantee measure provides that, in the event a
holding company or holding company subsidiary should require FDIC
assistance, all of the insured subsidiaries of the holding company are
liable for the costs the FDIC incurs. 89 Thus, if a subsidiary bank fails
or nears default, its commonly controlled affiliates may be charged for
the cost of the bailout.90 Likewise, if a holding company is in financial
91
straits, all of its subsidiaries are liable if the FDIC steps in.
The FDIC's right to collect cross-guarantee payments is subordinate to depositor rights and rights of secured creditors. It has priority, however, over the rights of other commonly controlled institutions
and shareholders, including bank holding companies.92 Thus, while
87. Id. at 187.
88. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 21935 (cited in note 33). See also Swire, 42 Duke L. J. at 497-503
(cited in note 6). Professor Swire notes that one common justification for measures like the
cross-guarantee is that they are needed to "save the [deposit insurance) fund." Id. at 497. He
argues that the moral hazard problem, which leads to high-risk practices, along with equitable
considerations, and the difficulty regulators face in collection of debts, lend credence to the "save
the fund" argument. Id. at 498-501. On the other hand, Professor Swire argues that the "save
the fund" argument is too open-ended in that it justifies far-reaching governmental influence
over banks. Id. at 501. Overall, Professor Swire is unconvinced that preservation of deposit
insurance funds is a valid justification for special bank insolvency rules. Id. at 503.
89. FIRREA § 206, 103 Stat. at 201-05. The loss for which such subsidiaries are liable is
that which the FDIC either actually incurs or anticipates incurring. Id. § 206(e)(1)(A). The
FDIC is required to make a good faith estimate of its anticipated losses. Id. § 206(e)(2)(A). It
may recoup additional amounts if it underestimates its costs, and must reimburse each subsidiary its pro rata share if it overestimates its costs. Id. § 206(e)(2)(D). If more than one subsidiary is assessed by the FDIC, each subsidiary will be held jointly and severally liable for the
FDIC's losses. 55 Fed. Reg. at 21935 (cited in note 33).
90. FIRREA § 206, 103 Stat. at 201-05. The measure only applies to commonly controlled
banks, and only affiliates, not parent companies, may be assessed. "Control" is defined as it is
in the Bank Holding Company Act. Id. § 206(e)(9). See note 47.
91. FIRREA § 206(e)(1)(A), 103 Stat. at 201-05.
92. Id. §§ 206(e)(2)(C)(i)-(ii) (setting forth the priority of cross-guarantee liability). The
legislative history explains that the cross-guarantee is subordinate to senior debt holders in
order to protect their reliance interest. H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 412 (cited in note 23).
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all non-affiliated debtholders remain protected under the measure,
the holding company structure is forced to absorb the costs involved
with affiliate failure. 93
Although the measure does not directly impose responsibility
on holding companies, 94 the cross-guarantee is similar to the sourceof-strength doctrine and related measures in that it allows the government to deplete holding company resources by assessing its subsidiaries. 95 Because holding companies are, by definition, primary
investors in their subsidiaries, any assessment against those subsidiaries is essentially a charge against the holding company. In this
manner, the cross-guarantee is designed to encourage holding companies to monitor and discipline the activities of their subsidiaries so as
to decrease the moral hazard problem. 96
Recall that, in theory, the security of deposit insurance and the
limited liability principle give bank management the incentive to
engage in riskier than average practices; this incentive remains constant as a bank approaches insolvency. Furthermore, the holding
company structure exacerbates the moral hazard problem, because
holding companies control an institution, and are thereby able to shift
93. A number of other provisions serve to soften the cross-guarantee's blow. For example,
the FDIC has discretion to waive or reduce cross-guarantee liability if it judges that exemption
is in the BIF's best interests, FIRREA § 206(e)(5)(A), 103 Stat. at 203, as long as the exempted
institution and its affiliates comply with §§ 23(A)-(B) of the Federal Reserve Act, id. §
206(e)(5)(B). See also 55 Fed. Reg. at 21935-36 (cited in note 33) (delineating guidelines for
waiving liability). In addition, for five years after FIRREA's enactment, banks were not obliged
to reimburse the FDIC for the failure of affiliated thrifts, and vice versa. FIRREA § 206(e)(6),
103 Stat. at 104. For further discussion of the exceptions to the cross-guarantee, see H.R. Rep.
No. 101-54 at 326 (cited in note 23).
94. "Controlling company guarantees," which would force holding companies to reimburse
the FDIC for the failure of their affiliates, were proposed as part of FIDICIA, 105 Stat. at 2236.
As discussed above, such a provision would have constituted a modified codification of the
source-of-strength doctrine, which had been invalidated the year after FIRREA's enactment.
See note 73. Congress did not adopt the controlling company guarantee, but did provide for a
limited guarantee to be imposed on holding companies in some circumstances. FIDICIA §
131(e)(2)(C), 105 Stat. at 2256. See also Broome, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 963-67 (cited in note
15) (discussing FIDICIA's guarantee provisions and their implications on insolvency risk distribution).
95. See Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 537 (cited in note 19) ("lilt empowers the federal
government to make an indirect claim on the resources of [such companies; moreover] ... the
cross-guarantee provision effectively dilutes a holding company's investment in [its] affiliates
and thereby depletes its resources").
96. Therefore, the measure's efficacy is in part dependent on the assumption that holding
companies are, in reality, able to control and influence the policies and practices of their subsidiaries. This assumption is weakened in the case where there are so-called "uncommon
shareholders" in subsidiary banks, which are likewise subject to cross-guarantee liability, but
are unable to control the policies or risk-taking of other subsidiaries. The uncommon
shareholders, however, still benefit from the asset-shifting capabilities of the holding company,
and are aware of the pervasive governmental regulation of such companies. Thus, it is fair to
subject such shareholders to the cross-guarantee. See note 297.
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assets from one member of the enterprise to another. In this way,
holding companies are particularly well-suited to exploit the deposit
97
insurance system.
The potential of cross-guarantee liability radically alters these
incentives. For example, assume Holding Company wholly owns
Bank A and Bank B, the depositors of which are federally insured, as
well as several uninsured enterprises. In the absence of the crossguarantee, Holding Company has the incentive to increase its potential profits by concentrating higher-risk loans in its banks and lowerrisk loans in its unregulated subsidiaries. Thus, Holding Company,
which controls the practices of all its subsidiaries, will stream the
higher-risk loans to Banks A and B, increasing their chances for
failure, but also increasing Holding Company's potential to earn large
profits. The lower-risk assets will be held by the unregulated
subsidiaries, increasing their stability.
If, for example, Bank A neared insolvency due to its plethora of
high-risk loans, Holding Company, having only its investment to lose,
would have "bet the farm." It would have the incentive to stream
risky loans to Bank A in the hopes that the profits made would
stabilize it. It would also have the incentive to stream less risky loans
from Bank A to its healthy affiliates so that those assets would not be
lost in the event of Bank A's failure. If Bank A did fail, its depositors
would be compensated by the FDIC. Although Holding Company
would lose its investment, it would not be liable for Bank A's debts.
On the other hand, because Holding Company had the wherewithal to
virtually ensure the stability of its other subsidiaries, its losses from
Bank A may have been outweighed by the dividends it received from
those entities.
In contrast, since the cross-guarantee's enactment, if Holding
Company engages in the same type of asset-streaming, placing Bank
A at risk, it faces dire consequences. If Bank A fails, and the FDIC
bails out its depositors, all of its insured subsidiaries, including Bank
B, may now be assessed for the cost. Because Holding Company owns
Bank B, Holding Company will effectively face the cost of any
assessment against Bank B. Thus, its incentive to exploit the deposit
insurance system is reduced.
Furthermore, Holding Company will have little motive to "bet
the farm" as Bank A approaches insolvency. On the contrary, because

97.

See notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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it will be held indirectly liable for the entire cost of an FDIC bailout,
Holding Company will want to limit Bank A's losses. Overall, the
cross-guarantee will encourage Holding Company to act as if deposit
insurance did not exist: the company will want to discourage risktaking by management in order to prevent the failure of any of its
members. In this way, the cross-guarantee serves as a deterrent to
the moral hazard problem, and may prevent the insurance fund depletion that the moral hazard causes.98
The impact on Holding Company in the event Bank A does fail
may be dramatic. If, for example, Bank A, at the time of insolvency,
owes its depositors $10 million, then Bank B may be assessed for that
amount, plus other costs to the FDIC. Holding Company is indirectly
responsible for that amount. If Bank B has a net worth of $5 million
when Bank A fails, the $10 million-plus assessment will drive Bank B
into insolvency as well. Because the shareholders of Holding
Company are the same as the shareholders of Bank B, Holding
Company will, most likely, be bankrupted by these liabilities.
Because of Bank A's failure, the FDIC will probably be able to liquidate and sell the entire holding company structure.
The implications of the cross-guarantee are powerful. In theory, the moral hazard problem may be essentially eliminated by the
provision. Conversely, because the exercise of the cross-guarantee
power does not depend on a showing of fraud, abuse, or disregard for
corporate forms, theoretically it may destroy a holding company structure, worth millions or billions of dollars, which has done its best to
avoid risk-taking, but which has been befallen by adversities beyond
its control. Issues of fairness and constitutionality thus arise as a
result of the cross-guarantee's enactment. Specifically, critics have
argued that the use of the cross-guarantee effects a taking without
just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
In order to develop the background for analyzing the above
criticism, the next Part discusses current takings jurisprudence.

98.

See Part V.C (arguing that the cross-guarantee effectively achieves this objective).
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III. CURRENT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Analytical Frameworkfor Deciding Takings Issues
The Fifth Amendment states: "... [Nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 9 The Takings
Clause implies that the federal government has the authority to take
private property. This authority is known as the power of "eminent
domain."'10 0 On the other hand, the compensation requirement is an
embodiment of the Constitution's overarching philosophy that
protection of individual property rights is essential to the
preservation of liberty.10 As the Supreme Court stated in Armstrong
v. United States:102

"[The] Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is]

designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."'0 3
Over the years, the Supreme Court has struggled to define a
viable analysis for evaluating takings issues. 04 The process is a difficult one. Although the Fifth Amendment clearly requires compensation for any taking, the Court has long recognized that the government should not have to reimburse citizens every time property rights
or economic interests are harmed by an action of the state. 0 5 If such a
requirement existed, government would be effectively crippled
99.

U.S. Const., Amend. V.

100. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardianof Every Other Right: A ConstitutionalHistory
of PropertyRights 5 (Oxford, 1992) (defining eminent domain as "the power to compel a transfer
of property from a private owner to the government for a public purpose").
101. See id. at 3 ("Throughout much of American history, economic liberty was an essential
component of constitutionalism.... The protection given to property was fully consistent with
one msjor theme of American constitutionalism-the restraint of government power over
individuals. Historically, property ownership was viewed as establishing the economic basis for
freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of liberty").
But see Zeppos,
Developments in Administrative Law at 247 (cited in note 44) (noting that, despite the Framers'
commitment to property rights, constitutional protection of property has diminished greatly in
the twentieth century).
102. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
103. Id. at 49. For instance, the Takings Clause is designed to prohibit the government
from destroying one private citizen's home, without compensation, to build a road that will serve
the entire community.
104. Professor Zeppos notes that the Court's recent takings jurisprudence developed
through a series of zoning and land use cases. Zeppos, Developments in Administrative Law at
248 (cited in note 44).
105. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the law").
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because nearly every type of state-imposed duty or liability hurts
economic interests in one way or another. Thus, the proper inquiry is
when has the government gone too far, so that its action effects a

taking?106

In attempting to draw this difficult line, the Court has created
two major categories of takings: per se takings and regulatory takings. Per se takings include the relatively easy instances of the exercise of eminent domain by the state. 107 For example, if the government condemns and takes title to a citizen's home so that a public
reservoir may be constructed, it is undisputed that the homeowner
must be compensated.18 Recently, however, the Court has included
two other types of state actions in the per se category.
First, the Court has held that, if the government physically
occupies 0 9 an individual's property, it effects a taking. The seminal
case regarding physical occupations is Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.11 0 In Loretto, a New York law required landlords to allow, for a maximum $1 fee, cable television companies to
install cable facilities in their tenants' apartments.," A landlord challenged the measure, arguing that the forced trespass constituted a
taking.

112

The Court, drawing on past decisions, found that the statute
effected a taking without just compensation." 3 The Court reaffirmed
106. See id. at 415 ('The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"). This view is in
accordance with the "simple insurance model" of takings law. Under this model, the Takings
Clause operates as an insurance policy against governmental appropriations of property. In
order for the clause to work efficiently, however, it must not be used to require compensation for
small diminutions in value or trivial physical intrusions. See Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings
"Accidents:" A Tort Perspectiveon Takings Law, 28 U. Richmond L. Rev. 1235, 1240-42 (1994).
107. This rule is derived from English common law and has been a part of American law
since colonial times. Ely, The Guardianat 23-25 (cited in note 100).
108. See, for example, United States v. 403.15 Acres of Land, 316 F. Supp. 655, 655-56
(M.D. Tenn. 1970) (concerning the proper disposition of a compensation award paid to a landowner whose land was taken to facilitate the building of a dam and reservoir project).
109. Physical occupation includes laws authorizing or mandating such occupation, as was
the case in Loretto v. Teleprompter ManhattanCATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,423 n.3 (1982).
110. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
111. Id. at 421, 423 n.3.
112. Id. at 424.
113. Id. at 425-41. The Court pointed to early cases like Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall) 166, 177-78 (1871), in which a state was forced to pay a landowner whose property was flooded by a state-built dam, for the proposition that a taking occurs anytime the
government permanently physically invades land. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427. Additionally, the
Court cited KaiserAetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979), in which a governmental
imposition of a navigational servitude requiring public access to a pond was found to constitute
a taking because the landowner had reasonably relied on the right to exclude others from the
pond. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433. Because the owner's right to exclude was "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property," interfering
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the principle that permanent physical invasions of property constitute
per se takings."1 Although it set forth a clear category of per se takings, it emphasized the narrowness of its holding, stating that the
rule did not apply to regulations governing the use of property.11 5 In
the recent case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,l16 however, the Court expanded the per se category to include certain regulations of land use, when such restrictions deprive the owner of all
11 7
economically viable use of her property.
In Lucas, the plaintiff bought two parcels of beachfront property, with the intent to build homes upon them. Before he could do*so,
South Carolina passed a law requiring governmental approval to
build on property prone to shore erosion. The landowner was prohibited from developing his lots. He sued, claiming a taking."8 The state
supreme court, in denying the claim, relied on previous cases that had
permitted the destruction of property value when the regulation was
intended to prohibit "noxious" land uses, those that harmed the public
health, morals, or safety." 9
The Lucas Court, however, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
changed its approach to evaluating regulations that eliminate the
value of property. Justice Scalia stated that when such a rule destroys all economically viable use of property, it effects a per se taking.120 He argued that no real distinction exists between regulations
that prevent harm and those intended to benefit society; accordingly,
he declared the "noxious uses" justification, which had previously
2
been used to avoid the compensation requirement, defunct.' '
Moreover, in clarifying his addition to the per se taking category,
Justice Scalia stated that a law that effects the elimination of all

with that right amounted to an actual physical invasion of the land, and was thus a per se
taking. Id.
114. Id. at 441. The Court stated that such a rule avoids line-drawing problems, and noted
that difficulties with proving invasion will be rare. Id. at 436-38.
115. Id. at 441.
116. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992).
117. Id. at 2899-2900.
118. Id. at 2890.
119. Id. at 2897. The Court cited Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a
prohibition against manufacturing alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (permitting a ban on mill operations in a residential area); Miller v. Schoene, State
Entomologist, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (allowing state destruction of diseased cedar trees to prevent
the disease from spreading to an orchard); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(permitting the state to shut down a quarry in a residential area).
120. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
121. Id. at 2898-99.
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valuable use is permissible only if it is grounded on the state's common law of property or nuisance.122
In sum, Loretto and Lucas establish two types of per se takings. If the governmental action constitutes a permanent physical
invasion of property, or if it destroys all economically viable use of
such property, it is an unconstitutional taking.
Another type of takings claim arises when a regulation restricts the use of property or diminishes the property's value.
Because of the infinite variety of such measures, so-called
"regulatory" takings claims are not treated categorically like per se
takings, but instead are analyzed on an ad-hoc basis. The obvious
problem for the Court in evaluating these claims was to establish a
23
clear test to discern when the government has gone "too far.1

The

Court

formulated

TransportationCo. v. New

such

York.124

a

test in Penn Central

In that case, the owner of Grand

Central Station in New York City challenged the city's Landmark
Preservation Law, which placed various obligations and restrictions
on owners of certain designated "historical" structures. 125

The

plaintiff wished to construct an office building on top of the standing
structure. 26 The city denied the application to alter the landmark,
claiming that the addition would "overwhelm the Terminal by its
sheer mass.1 ' 27 The plaintiff sued, arguing that the landmark law

122. Id. at 2899. In other words, the state must compensate an owner for destroying her
use of property unless it "imposes a restriction that the courts of the state could have enforced
under general principles of property or nuisance law." Zeppos, Developments in Administrative
Law at 256 (cited in note 44).
Lucas's strict rule raises interesting issues with regard to the cross-guarantee's constitutionality. It suggests that, if a cross-guarantee assessment imposes a large enough hardship on
shareholders, it will effect a taking, unless it can be grounded in state nuisance law. This
reasoning, in fact, appears to have influenced the Branch court's decision to invalidate the crossguarantee. See id. at 51 ("[The claims court's decision in Branch is a predictable consequence of
Lucas").
On the other hand, one can argue that Lucas is not applicable to the analysis of the crossguarantee. The Court's dicta acknowledged that an investor in personal property, especially
highly regulated property, ought to recognize the possibility that governmental regulation may
render her property valueless. As such, she should not receive compensation when such a
regulation is passed. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. See Part V.A. More importantly, this Note
argues that the cross-guarantee does not completely eradicate bank holding company shareholders' property value. Thus, Lucas's rule is not triggered. See Part V.B.
123. PennsylvaniaCoal, 260 U.S. at 415.
124. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
125. Id. at 110-15 (describing the operation of the law).
126. Id. at 116.
127. Id. at 118. The City did, however, give the plaintiff the right to develop an adjacent
parcel. Id. at 120.
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effected a taking of the plaintiff's property by diminishing the
potential revenues the plaintiff could reap through development.128
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, rejected the claim.29
In so doing, he set forth a comprehensive analysis of regulatory takings claims. He identified several factors which had, in previous
cases, consistently come to the forefront. These were the degree to
which the regulation interfered with the property owner's investmentbacked expectations, the economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner, and the nature of the governmental action.130
Justice Brennan first argued that, in order for any takings
claim to prevail, whether regulatory or per se, the claimant must
show at least some interference with her reasonable investmentbacked expectations.131 Once a statute abrogating property rights is
in place, later purchasers of the regulated property have no reasonable expectation that the statute will not be utilized or enforced.132
Although Penn Central acquired its property before the landmark law
was passed, Justice Brennan concluded that the law did not interfere
with Penn Central's expectation concerning the use of the property
because it allowed the company to continue to operate the terminal as
13
a railroad station. 3
With regard to the economic impact of a regulation, Justice
Brennan rejected the argument that a significant diminution of property value will effect a taking when only a few select property owners
are adversely affected by the measure. Instead, he stated that
legislation often burdens some people more than others, and that such
a discriminatory effect does not render the legislation a taking. 3 4
Moreover, when the burden placed on the claimant is combined with
concomitant benefits to that claimant, the plaintiffs argument that
128. Id. at 119.
129. Id. at 138.
130. Id. at 124.
131. Id. at 124-25 (noting that the Court had previously rejected claims where the interest
at stake was not "sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to
constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes'). See also Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 630
(acknowledging the requirement of showing interference with investment-backed expectations);
California Housing Securities, Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(same).
132. This distinction is mandated because takings claims essentially involve challenges to
retroactive applications of laws. See Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory
Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 27 Harv. J. Legis. 367, 388-89 (1990). Mr. Curtis argues that,
with regard to the cross-guarantee, the only shareholders who can bring a legitimate takings
claim are those who invested prior to FIRREA's enactment. Id.
133. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
134. Id. at 133-34.
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the value of her property has been diminished is severely weakened. 1 5
Although the landmark law did place economic burdens on designated
property owners, it did so in a way that benefited the entire city,
including Penn Central. 136 Thus, Penn Central was not severely
137
harmed by the measure.
The proper standard for evaluating the nature of the governmental action was set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission. 38 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the
governmental action or regulation at issue must substantially
advance a legitimate state interest. 3 9 He stated that the requirement
is more stringent than the rational basis test used to analyze due
0
process and equal protection claims involving economic interests.4
This scrutiny was clarified in the recent case of Dolan v. City of
Tigard.'4 ' In Dolan, the owner of a hardware store wished to replace
the existing structure with a larger one.142 A creek ran through one
corner of her lot.'43 The area surrounding the creek was designated as
a floodplain, unusable for commercial development.'44 The proposed
construction would have caused additional water runoff from the
floodplain on her property, but did not actually encroach on the floodplain.4 5 The city conditioned the plaintiff's development permit in
6
part on her promise to deed a portion of the floodplain to the city.4
135. Id. at 134-35. This principle was reiterated in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986), and significantly affects the analysis of the cross-guarantee's
fairness. If holding companies benefit from the measure, and from the viability of the deposit
insurance system in general, it is equitable to subject them to concomitant liability. See notes
296-97 and accompanying text.
136. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35.
137. Id.
138. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nollan concerned a challenge by owners of beachfront property
who were required to grant a public easement across their lot in order to obtain permission to
construct a bungalow on the lot. Id. at 828. The Nollans argued that the state must show a
direct relationship between the condition and the policy behind it-ensuring public access to the
beach. Id. The Court found the state's argument that the bungalow would prevent "visual
access" to the beach unworkable, and instead held that the condition did not meet even the
roughest means-ends test, as no "essential nexus" was established between the state's interest
and the condition imposed. Id. at 838-39.
139. Id. at 834.
140. Id. at 834 n.3 ("We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the
'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the state "could rationally have
decided"that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective'" (citation omitted)).
141. 114S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994).
142. Id. at 2313.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2315 (relating the City Planning Commission's finding that there would be
"increased storm water flow from the subject property to an already strained creek and drainage
basin" (citation omitted)).
146. Id. at 2314.
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The city claimed that the requirement of dedication was necessary in
order to deal with the water runoff problem, but the plaintiff sued,
arguing that the requirement bore no substantial relation to the proposed development.147
The Court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that the government bears the burden of proving that there is a "rough proportionality" between the requirement imposed on the owner and the problem
the exaction is intended to solve.148 In other words, the government
must show that the regulation is somewhat related in nature and
degree to the purpose it is intended to achieve.149 Using this test, the
Court found that the dedication requirement constituted a taking.50
It found that the city's need to deal with the runoff problem could be
met without appropriating the plaintiffs land.151 Thus, the permit
condition was not "roughly proportional" to the problems it was intended to solve.52
The analytical framework the Court has established to evaluate takings claims is relatively simple. There are two classes of takings, per se and regulatory. In asserting either type, the plaintiff
must establish a frustration of her reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Then, if the plaintiff shows either a physical invasion of
her land or a deprivation of all economically viable use of her land,
the Court will find a per se taking. If she can only show a diminution
in the value of her property, the Court will apply the three-pronged
Penn Central test. It will consider the degree to which her legitimate
expectations have been frustrated, and, in related fashion, will determine how the measure impacted her economically at the time it
was passed. On the other side of the scale, the Court will decide

147. Id. at 2315.
148. Id. at 2319. The Court explained its analysis as follows:
In evaluating petitioner's claim, we must first determine whether the "essential nexus"
exists between the "legitimate state interest" and the permit condition exacted by the
city. If we find a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection
between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development. We were
not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that the connection
did not meet even the loosest standard.
Id. at 2317 (citation omitted). In Dolan, the Court resolved that question by declaring that the
exaction must be "roughly proportional" in nature and extent to the development's impact. Id.
at 2319-20.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2322.
151. Id. at 2320.
152. Id. at 2321.
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whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate governmental interest by applying a rough proportionality test.
Although the analysis of takings issues has been simply formulated, the sheer variety of claims that come before the courts has
made it difficult to apply the analytic framework with much certainty.
This Note next discusses some patterns that have emerged in recent
takings decisions, and which suggest the Supreme Court's likely
15 3
stance on the constitutionality of the cross-guarantee.
B. Recent Trends in Takings Jurisprudence
1. In General
The right to be compensated for a governmental taking of one's
property is an economic right, and the Court's posture toward economic constitutional rights suggests that it would uphold most
1 554 Indeed, the
governmental actions that burden property rights.
Court's analytical framework in takings cases tilts in favor of the
government: only in cases of actual seizure, physical occupation, or
economic destruction must the government automatically compensate
the property owner. In all other cases, the Penn Central test will be
used.
The Penn Central analysis has proved very beneficial to the
government. Few regulatory takings claims have survived judicial
scrutiny. The reasons for judicial deference to the government when
it comes to regulations adversely affecting economic interests are
many and controversial. It is clear, however, that challenges to the
cross-guarantee will be difficult to win on regulatory takings grounds.
More specifically, courts have been wary of claims involving highly
regulated entities, especially banks.

153. These patterns also place potential holding company investors on notice of the likelihood that governmental regulations affecting the value of their investments will be upheld by
the courts. Such notice in turn decreases their investment-backed expectations, and weakens
the argument that a takings claim will be upheld. See Part V.A.
154. Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has taken a deferential stance with regard to
governmental regulations that burden economic rights. See, for example, Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a state-imposed price floor for milk); West CoastHotel Co. v.
Parrish,300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law); Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (upholding an act providing temporary relief
from foreclosure against a contracts clause challenge); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding a law forbidding opticians from fitting eyeglasses
without a prescription). For a detailed analysis of the Court's approach to economic rights cases
in modem times, see Ely, The Guardianat 119-152 (cited in note 100).
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2. Regulatory Takings Claims of Investors in Regulated Entities
Courts have generally been reluctant to uphold takings claims
when the claimant is an investor in a highly regulated industry. This
general pattern stems from an analysis of those investors' reasonable
investment-backed expectations. Because such investors are aware of
the nature and the extent of the regulatory scheme governing the
entity when they invest, they cannot legitimately expect that those
regulations will not change in a way that hurts them economically.155
George Miller and Jonathan Abram note that a debate has
been going on in the courts regarding reasonable expectations in a
regulated economy. 156 The disagreement concerns the requisite relationship between the preexisting regulatory scheme and the new
regulation. Must the state reserve the authority to enact a subsequent measure so as to forewarn investors specifically, or is a more
general prior regulatory scheme sufficient?' 57 Miller and Abram state
that Lucas requires specificity in the preexisting regulatory system.
That case suggests that the takings issue turns on whether the postinvestment regulation deviates from the law at the time the owner
invested.15 8 Miller and Abram also note, however, that the lower
courts have not read Lucas so restrictively.' 59
For example, in Preseault v. United States,16 the Court of
Federal Claims considered the constitutionality of the "Rails to Trails"
statute, which governed owners of property subject to railroad easements.1 61
According to the statute, the Interstate Commerce

155. See, for example, Preseaultv. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 96 (1992) (holding that the
complex regulatory scheme governing the claimants at the time of their acquisition of certain
property interests eliminated any reasonable expectation they may have had that burdensome
regulation would not be enacted).
156. George W. Miller and Jonathan L. Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the
Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev.
863 (1993).
157. Id. at 865.
158. Id. at 864.
159. Id. at 865 ("The Court of Federal Claims... suggests that the preexisting regulatory
scheme need not have addressed the later-prohibited use very specifically at all"). Perhaps this
deviation can be explained by the fact that Lucas does not apply to cases where a regulation
deprives a property owner of only part of her value or use. Instead, Lucas's rule appears to
govern only those cases where a court finds total economic destruction has been exacted by the
state. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if ...the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with" (emphasis added)).
160. 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992).
161. Id. at 92-94.
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Commission ("ICC") had the authority to preserve railroad easements
on private property for future railroad use and to build recreational
trails on the easements in the interim.162 A group of property owners

sued, claiming that the easements had been abandoned prior to the
enactment, and had thus reverted to the plaintiffs; therefore, when
6
the ICC asserted title to the land, it effected a taking.1 3

The court rejected the claim despite the fact that it relied on
the Lucas holding.164 It warned that the mere reference to a general
regulatory scheme is insufficient to undermine an owner's reasonable
expectation of her right to use the property without interference, but
nevertheless concluded that the preexisting scheme, while not specifically precluding the plaintiffs' exercise of their reversionary interests,
had undermined their expectation of such a reversion. 65 Thus, the
court seemed to depart from the reading of Lucas that mandates that,
to forestall a takings claim, the specific preclusion be part of the prior
regulatory scheme. 166
3. Regulatory and Per Se Takings Cases Involving Bank Regulations
As the above discussion illustrates, it is unclear how specifically a preexisting regulatory scheme must provide for a subsequent
prohibited use. It seems evident, however, that the sheer magnitude
of the government's control over banks makes courts wary of upholding takings claims by bank shareholders. Numerous claims have been
brought by bank shareholders challenging a wide variety of banking
regulations, but to no avail.167 Courts are reluctant to uphold takings

162. National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 97 Stat. 42,
48, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994 ed.).
163. Preseault,27 Fed. Cl. at 71.
164. Id. at 94.
165. Id.
166. Miller and Abram, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 865 (cited in note 156). Miller and Abram
also note that earlier cases were even more deferential to the state. Cases such as American
Satellite Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 146, 159-60 (1992), found no frustration of legitimate
expectations when the new measure was consistent with the preexisting regulatory scheme. In
American Satellite, the Federal Claims Court held that a person who contracted with the
government to launch a space satellite had no legitimate expectation that, in the wake of the
Challenger disaster, the government would not cancel the contract. Id. at 160.
167. See, for example, American Continental Corp. v. United States, 22 CI. Ct. 692, 693
(1991) (denying a claim that placement into FSLIC receivership effected a taking); California
Housing Securities, 959 F.2d at 955 (denying a thrift's claim that placement into Resolution
Trust Corporation receivership constituted a physical seizure of the thrift's assets and therefore
worked a taking); Golden Pacific Bancorp, 15 F.3d at 1066 (denying a similar claim where a
bank argued that the Comptroller of the Currency improperly caused the bank to fail by
"reneging" on a commitment to count "Yellow" certificates of deposit as assets rather than as
deposits).
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claims in banking cases because bank shareholders, having invested
in one of the nation's most regulated entities, 168 have very low investment-backed expectations.
In American Continental Corp. v. United States,169 a thrift was
placed into receivership by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
('FHLBB") due to its determination that the thrift was in an "unsafe
and unsound condition.'

170

The shareholders of the thrift claimed the

seizure effected a per se taking. 17' They argued that the corpora' expectations had been defeated because, at the time the cortion's172
poration was chartered, the federal government had no power to
appoint a receiver.

73

The Federal Claims Court disagreed. The court stated that it
is not reasonable for an investor in a highly regulated entity to expect
that regulations will not be "buttressed by subsequent amendments to
achieve the legislative end."' 74 Therefore, although the corporation
was established before the power to appoint a receiver was conferred
upon the federal government, the later enactment of that power did
not frustrate the corporation's expectations.17s
American Continental also addressed the reasonable expectations of the thrift's shareholders. The shareholders argued that they
had a reasonable expectation that they could retain the right to control their property, the thrift.176 The court held that they did not have

such an expectation, because the law at the time they invested gave
the government the power to appoint a receiver if it deemed the thrift
to be engaging in unsafe or unsound practices. 77 The court thus implicitly precluded the possible argument that the shareholders' expectations could be defined by considering the law at the time the corpo78
ration was chartered.
168. See American Continental, 22 Cl. Ct. at 695 (noting that the federal government
regulates many aspects of the operations of savings and loan associations in order to protect the
strong public interest in maintaining the stability of such entities). See also Part II (detailing
the regulatory scheme that governs banks).
169. 22 Cl. Ct. 692 (1991).
170. Id. at 693.
171. Id. at 694.
172. The plaintiffs brought both a shareholders' derivative action on behalf of the corporation and an action on behalf of the shareholders themselves. Id.
173. Id. at 697.
174. Id. (quoting FHA v. The Darlington,Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
175. Id. at 700.
176. Id. at 694.
177. Id. at 697.
178. This argument was made and accepted by the Court of Federal Claims in Branch, 31
Fed. Cl. at 626, which struck down the cross-guarantee as a taking. Id. at 634, 637. It makes
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Another pattern evident in the banking cases is the unwillingness of courts to find that bank regulations effect per se takings. 179 In
California Housing Securities, Inc. v. United States,1
s8 thrift shareholders argued that the government effected a per se taking when it
placed the thrift into receivership. 181 Relying on Loretto, the plaintiffs
claimed that the seizure constituted a physical occupation of their
property, the thrift. 18 2 In denying the claim, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that their property had been physically invaded,
pointing to the lack of a real-world expectation that the thrift would
not be seized if it was deemed to have engaged in unsafe or unsound
practices. 83 Thus, the plaintiffs' attempt to avoid an expectations
analysis by relying on a Loretto argument was unsuccessful.
Furthermore, because the seizure of a bank or thrift is probably as
close to physical occupation as is possible in banking cases, the
California Housing decision should spell doom for per se takings
claims in other banking cases.
Overall, the trend in the banking cases is to deny takings
claims. Courts are loathe to find a per se taking, and are very reluctant to find a regulatory taking due to the fact that bank shareholders
have limited investment-backed expectations. These trends should
impact the assessment of the cross-guarantee's validity.
4. Connolly and ConcretePipe
Finally, two Supreme Court cases will significantly affect the
evaluation of the cross-guarantee.
Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation18 and Concrete Pipe and Products of Cal. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal.185 addressed
the constitutionality of pension plan regulations rather than bank
regulations, but are relevant because they involve governmental
more sense, however, to follow American Continental, analyzing a property owner's "real world"
expectations from the time she invests, rather than from the time that the entity was created.
This is the approach advocated by Lucas. 112 S. Ct. at 2899. See also Part VA.I.
179. The American Continental court, in fact, cautioned against applying Loretto in cases
brought by bank shareholders: 'The Loretto per se approach should not facilely be extended in
cases where the historically rooted expectations that underlie the Loretto decision do not
remotely apply. The instant case involves a regulatory action in a highly regulated industry in
which the government took actions that reasonably should have been expected by plaintiffs." 22
Cl. Ct. at 701.
180. 959 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 957.
182. Id. at 956-57.
183. Id. at 958 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(6)(A)(ii) (1994 ed.)).
184. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
185. 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1993).
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elimination of limited liability in a structure similar to a holding
company.
In both cases, employers challenged the withdrawal
liability provision of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980 ('"MPPAA").16 The MPPAA amended the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 187 to mandate that
any employer who withdrew from a multiemployer plan faced liability
in proportion to that employer's share of the plan's unpaid-for
benefits. 88 The purpose of the additional liability was to ensure that
the employees covered under the plan were paid, and to preserve
simultaneously the solvency of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC"), which was charged with providing insurance to
pension beneficiaries.189 Thus, the withdrawal liability provision and
the cross-guarantee work in similar fashion.190
In Connolly, the employers argued that the MPPAA added
obligations that were not included in the contracts establishing their
multiemployer plans; under the contracts, the employers were liable
only for a designated contribution, not for a proportionate share of the
benefits.191 The employers claimed that the provision forced them to
make an uncompensated transfer of their assets to the PBGC and
therefore effected a taking.192
The Court denied the claim.193 The Court noted that it had
long recognized that the government may adjust economic benefits
and burdens without compensating affected parties, even if such adjustments take the form of added duties or enhanced liabilities.194 It
specifically found permissible the elimination of the limited liability
"right" found in the pension plan contracts. 9 5 Additionally, the Court

186. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 220; ConcretePipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2270-71.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1381-1461 (1988 ed. & Supp. V).
188. MPPAA, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.
(1988 ed. & Supp. V). For a discussion of the amendment's legislative history, see Connolly, 475
U.S. at 213-17.
189. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 215-17.
190. See notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Because of the characteristics these measures share, the Court's evaluation of the MPPAA should impact its analysis of the crossguarantee. For a discussion of the general similarities between multi-employer pension plans
and financial holding companies, see Jackson, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 540-42 (cited in note 19).
191. 475 U.S. at 218.
192. Id. at 221.
193. Id. at 222-23.
194. Id. at 223. The Court cited Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1976), for the proposition that rights and burdens may be regulated, as a general matter,
without effecting a taking. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223.
195. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224. The Court's statement demonstrates that limited liability
is not a fundamental or inviolable right, but is subject to governmental diminution or
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noted that the liability imposed would not be made "in a vacuum,"'1
but was directly dependent on the employers' relationship with the
plan; thus, the economic impact on the employers would not be inor197
dinate.
Finally, the Connolly Court evaluated the investment-backed
expectations of the employers who had participated in the regulated
plan. It held that the plaintiffs had notice at the time that they joined
the plan that pension plans were of significant concern to the government, were currently being regulated, and could be subject to changes
in the regulatory scheme. 198 The Court concluded that the withdrawal
liability provision was constitutional. 199
In ConcretePipe, decided in 1993, the claim was slightly different. Again, the employer pointed to a contractual "right" to limited
liability established when it entered the plan, which the Court dismissed by reference to Connolly.200 In addition, however, the employer claimed that none of its employees could have vested benefits
because the employer had not contributed to the plan for a sufficient
period of time. The government's assessment of liability therefore
bore no rational relationship to the employer's contributions and was
01
unconstitutional.2
In rejecting this argument, the Concrete Pipe Court made a
significant point. It stated that multiemployer pension plans essentially operate as a single entity, not as a group of separate individuals.202 Such plans allow a group of employers to pool their resources

so that each employer's contributions benefit all the employees coV-

eradication. See note 63 and accompanying text. For a contrary view, see notes 263-64 and
accompanying text.
196. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
197. Id. at 225-26. In contrast, the Branch Court distinguished the MPPAA from the crossguarantee by arguing that the cross-guarantee, unlike the MPPAA, bore no relationship to the
actions of the shareholders who are subjected to liability. 31 Fed. Cl. at 636-37. This reasoning,
however, is flawed: because holding companies essentially operate as a single enterprise, the
cross-guarantee, which imposes liability for failure on the entire enterprise, is proportional. See
notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
198. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227. Because this principle was reaffirmed in ConcretePipe, 113
S. Ct. at 2289-91, a case decided after Lucas, it seems likely that the Court will not, as a general
practice, adhere to Lucas's restrictive approach regarding deviation from the pre-regulatory
scheme in cases involving highly regulated entities like banks, especially where property value
is not destroyed.
199. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 228.
200. ConcretePipe, 113 S.Ct. at 2289-90 (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223-24).
201. Id. at 2287. The plaintiff actually made an economic substantive due process argument along with its takings argument. Id. at 2286. The Court's due process analysis is pertinent to the evaluation of takings claims involving the imposition of added liabilities.
202. Id. at 2287-88.
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ered, not just their own. 203 In the same manner, the employers spread

among the entire membership the risks of their employees' benefits
vesting, so that each employer faces a lower average level of risk than
it would under a single employer plan. 204 The Court concluded that,

because the MPPAA spreads the costs among the employers in essentially the same manner as the employers would have spread the costs
among themselves, the liability provision was entirely fair, despite
the fact that some employers like Concrete Pipe might face liabilities
that did not stem from their own employees.205 By joining the plan,
Concrete Pipe assumed the risk of this possibility. 2°6 In this sense,
the Concrete Pipe Court reiterated the Penn Central Court's view that
the economic benefits to a takings claimant should be considered
along with the costs.
This reasoning may be translated into an analysis of the crossguarantee. Holding companies resemble multiemployer pension plans
in that the structure allows the members to spread the risks of loss
among a number of members. Holding companies therefore also have
the ability to operate as a single entity rather than as a group of
separate member banks. 2 7 Because they benefit from the structure
they assume and from the security of deposit insurance, bank holding
companies should bear the concomitant costs that arise from the
utilization of those privileges.208

Connolly and Concrete Pipe seem to place the Court's stamp of
approval on regulations that increase the liabilities or risks of investors who also benefit from the regulatory scheme governing their
property. These cases coincide with the general trend of rejecting
regulatory takings claims, which is especially pronounced when the
burdened property is highly regulated.
Despite these clear patterns, however, the cross-guarantee
failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny in one of the two cases to
analyze it. The next Part describes the facts and holdings of each
case, setting the stage for an assessment of the measure's validity.

203. Id. at 2288.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. With regard to Concrete Pipe's takings claim, the Court primarily relied on
Connolly to dismiss all of the plaintiffs arguments. Id. at 2295.
207. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
208. See notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
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IV. MERIDEN AND BRANCH: THE FIRST CASES EVALUATING THE
CROSS-GUARANTEE

Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC29 and Branch on
Behalf of Maine Natl. Bank v. United States,210 both decided in 1994,
are the first two cases to address the constitutionality of the crossguarantee. 211 Each case involved a challenge to an assessment of
liability pursuant to the cross-guarantee, rather than a facial chal212
lenge to its validity.
A. Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC
In connection with the 1991 failure of Central Bank for
Savings, a "commonly-controlled" affiliate of the Meriden Trust and
Safe Deposit Co., the FDIC assessed Meriden for the losses it incurred
214
in the bailout.213 The assessment totaled almost $152 million.
Meriden sought review of the FDIC's assessment, which was upheld
by the administrative law judge and the FDIC's board of directors.215
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut affirmed this
2
final agency action, granting the FDIC summary judgment. 16
In rendering its decision, the court summarily rejected the
argument that the cross-guarantee effected a taking.2 7 The court
reasoned that, because Meriden had voluntarily purchased federal

209. 868 F. Supp. 29 (D. Conn. 1994), aff'd, 62 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 1995).
210. 31 Fed. Cl. 626 (1994), certified for appeal, 42 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 1994).
211. In Meriden, the district court based its decision entirely on the plaintiff's voluntary
renewal of deposit insurance, and did not consider the other pertinent issues regarding the
cross-guarantee's overall constitutionality. 868 F. Supp. at 33. The Second Circuit, in affirming
Meriden, also based its decision on the renewal of deposit insurance, but gave limited attention
to other issues as well. See 62 F.3d at 455 (concluding that the appellants failed to overcome
the "heavy burden" faced by those alleging a regulatory taking). The Court of Federal Claims
evaluated these issues in Branch and found the cross-guarantee, as enacted, to be a
compensable taking to the extent that the plaintiff bank had acted in accordance with its
separate corporate form. 31 Fed. Cl. at 637. Because Branch provides a more complete analysis
of the questions surrounding the cross-guarantee, it will be used as the primary point of departure for this Note's evaluation.
These cases also demonstrate the impact of a court's decision on the cross-guarantee's
validity. The contrary holdings of the Meriden and Branch cases literally decided the disposition of millions or billions of dollars, along with the life or death of two holding company structures, showing the importance of carefully and fmally resolving this issue.
212. Meriden, 868 F. Supp. at 31 (describing the assessment leveled against each institution); Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 629 (same).
213. Meriden, 868 F. Supp. at 31.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 30.
217. Id. at 33.
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deposit insurance after FIRREA was passed, maintaining the ability
to accept deposits from the public, it chose to subject itself to the risk
of a cross-guarantee assessment. 218 Thus, the shareholders of the
trust company could not legitimately expect that they would not be
held liable by the FDIC.219
Meriden was affirmed by the Second Circuit.220

Again, the

court held that, because Meriden had chosen to participate in the
deposit insurance system, and had continued to participate in the
system after the enactment of the cross-guarantee, it assumed the
risk of a cross-guarantee assessment. 221 Moreover, the court argued
that, even if deposit insurance renewal was not dispositive, the crossguarantee assessment did not effect a taking.222 First, the adverse

impact Meriden suffered was partially due to its subsidiary's failure,
and could not be blamed entirely on the cross-guarantee's assessment. 23 Second, the cross-guarantee did not disrupt Meriden's rea-

sonable expectations because Meriden operated in a highly regulated
field. 24 Finally, the government's action merely adjusted economic

rights and burdens to promote the public interest.225
On the other hand, the Branch court rejected the argument
that voluntary renewal of deposit insurance negates a takings
claim.226

Furthermore, it reached the opposite conclusion from

Meriden with respect to the evaluation of the Penn Centralfactors.227
B. Branch on Behalf of Maine Natl. Bank v. United States
The Branch plaintiff was the Chapter 7 trustee of the estate of
the Bank of New England Corp. ("BNEC"), the holding company and
sole shareholder of Maine National Bank ('MNB").228 MNB was chartered in 1889, and was acquired by BNEC in 1985.229 BNEC owned
several other subsidiaries, including the Bank of New England, N.A.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
62 F.3d at 449.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Branch, 31 Fed. C1.at 628.

227. Id. at 635.
228. Id. at 628.
229. Id.
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("BNE"), and Connecticut Bank and Trust Co., N.A. ("CBT").230 MNB

and CBT remained healthy during the financial institutions crisis in

23
the late 1980s. 1

BNE, however, began to experience financial troubles in
1986.232 BNEC made efforts to stabilize the company by transferring
assets to its accounts, but the measures were futile. 233 The Office of

the Comptroller of the Currency ("0CC") declared the subsidiary and
BNEC insolvent on January 6, 1991, and placed them into FDIC
receivership. 234 That day, the FDIC served MNB with a Notice of
Assessment of Liability pursuant to the cross-guarantee power.235 The
26
assessment totaled just over $1 billion.
At the time it was charged, MNB's net worth totaled about $65
million.27 Because the cross-guarantee assessment was considered a
valid debt of MNB, the OCC declared it insolvent, and placed it into
receivership as well.238 Similar action was taken regarding BNE and
CBT. 239 BNEC was forced to file a petition for bankruptcy on January

7, 1991. 240 The FDIC, as receiver of all of the holding company
members, subsequently sold them to the Fleet/Norstar Financial
Group, Inc.241 Through its use of the cross-guarantee, the FDIC was
able to effect a transfer of the ownership of an ailing holding company
242
structure.
MNB filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that
the exercise of the cross-guarantee power had driven it into insolvency
and therefore constituted a taking of its property for a public use
without just compensation.243 MNB argued that it should be compensated for at least its entire net worth at the time of the cross-guarantee assessment, $65 million.24 The government moved for summary
230. Id.

231. Id.
232. Id. at 629.

233. Id.
234. Id.

235. Id.
236. Id. This amount was later lowered by the FDIC to $98,985,000. Id. at 629 n.2.
237. Id. at 629.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. It is probable that the FDIC's ability to effect transfers of entire bank holding companies through exercise of the cross-guarantee power, thereby retaining the going-concern value of
those companies, is a main purpose behind the measure. Retention of going-concern value is a
central goal of bankruptcy law. Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law

14-15 (Harvard U., 1986).
243. Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 629.
244. Id.
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judgment, arguing that the facts were undisputed and that the crossguarantee was constitutional as a matter of law. 245 In particular, the
government argued that the assessment did not effect a regulatory
taking because MNB voluntarily subjected itself to a pervasive regulatory scheme and thus "lacked the requisite investment-backed
expectation" that it would not be held liable.246 The government also
emphasized the fact that the cross-guarantee was intended to further
the public interest in a sound banking system.247 Finally, the
government stated that, overall, FIRREA benefited BNEC; therefore,
even if MNB was forced to bear a heavier share of the burden of the
cross-guarantee, that burden deprived BNEC of only h "strand" in its
248
"bundle" of property rights.
MNB argued that the assessment constituted a per se taking.249 Because the FDIC was able to seize the assets of the bank
subsequent to charging it with cross-guarantee liability, it had
physically appropriated the bank's property.2 50 MNB alternatively
argued that the assessment effected a regulatory taking as evaluated
under Penn Central.251 First, it argued that the assessment was not
carried out for the public good, but was instead intended to preserve
the FDIC.252 Next, it disputed the government's assertion that the
burden imposed by the cross-guarantee was somewhat beneficial to
253
MNB; to the contrary, the assessment destroyed the institution.
Finally, MNB claimed that the enactment of the cross-guarantee
radically frustrated its reasonable investment-backed expectation of
limited liability.254 It argued that the BHCA and established legal
precedent stood for the principle that the separate corporate status of
members of bank holding companies would be respected, and that
255
such members would not be held responsible for each others' debts.

245. Id. at 630-31.
246. Id. at 630.

247. Id.
248. Id. at 630-31 (citation omitted).
249. Id. at 631.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. MNB also argued that its continuation of deposit insurance was not voluntary, but

was mandatory under the BHCA. The fact that it was federally insured therefore could not
constitute a waiver of its rights under the Takings Clause. Id.
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The court considered all of these arguments, and denied the
government's motion for summary judgment.256
The court
concentrated its analysis on the historically rooted expectations of
MNB. It affirmed the principle that, to constitute a taking, a measure
must, at least to some degree, frustrate the claimant's legitimate
expectations. 257 The court recognized Preseault'sproposition that the
expectations of an investor in a highly regulated industry must be
evaluated in light of the regulatory scheme. 251 It distinguished that
case, however, arguing that the claimant in Preseaulthad purchased
her property long after the general regulatory scheme had been
enacted. 259 Conversely, MNB was chartered in 1889, long before the
passage of FIRREA, and FIRREA was not a continuation or a logical
extension of any regulatory scheme governing MNB in 1889. 2 60

Therefore, while the expectations of the Preseault plaintiff could be
measured against a 'backdrop of pervasive regulation, MNB's
expectations could not be calculated in this way. 261 Instead, the cross-

guarantee's impact had to be measured by comparison to the
regulatory scheme existing in 1889.262
Using this approach, the court held that the cross-guarantee
defeated MNB's expectations.263 It stated that the cross-guarantee's

enactment disrupted the bank's expectation that, if it complied with
governmental regulations, it would not be held responsible for
another corporation's debts. 2 4 According to the court, MNB had
reasonably relied on the principle of limited liability.
The court noted that MNB was operating in a highly regulated
industry, but stated that this fact did not amount to a waiver by MNB
of all of its property rights. 265 Instead, the court held that the waiver
of property rights is limited to what foreseeably could be waived at
the time of the investment. 266 Because the cross-guarantee operated
256. Id. at 637.
257. Id. at 632 (explaining the rationale behind the rule that expectations must be evaluated as "a way of limiting takings recoveries to owners who could demonstrate that they bought
their property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory
scheme") (quoting Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994))
See also notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
258. Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 632.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 633-34.
261. Id. at 633.
262. Id. at 633-34.
263. Id. at 632.
264. Id. at 633 ("The cross-guarantee's enactment] was an unforeseeable and radical
departure from the system under which MNB had been operating for almost a century").
265. Id. at 634.
266. Id.
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to deprive MNB of all of its assets, it exacted a total forfeiture of the

267
bank's property rights, and thus went too far.
The court held that, because the cross-guarantee had deprived
MNB of all of its assets, regulatory takings analysis was improper.
Instead, it found the assessment to effect a per se taking.268 Although
the court found that the cross-guarantee was intended to serve the
public good, as the government contended, it declined to consider that
269
factor, deeming it inapplicable in a per se taking evaluation.
Even though it held the charge against MNB to be a per se
taking, the court took the added step of distinguishing Connolly and
Concrete Pipe. It found that the withdrawal liability impositions in
those cases, though economically harmful to the employers, were at
least proportionate to those employers' experience in the plan because
they directly depended on the contributions made.270 In contrast, the
court found that the cross-guarantee liability imposed on MNB was in
no way proportionate to any debt MNB owed to the FDIC or related to
any interaction it had with the FDIC.271 Instead, the liability effected
a destruction of MNB's entire net worth, based entirely on another
corporation's failure. 272 Thus, the cross-guarantee could not be
73
validated under Connolly and Concrete Pipe.
In sum, the court held that MNB's historically-rooted expectation of limited liability was frustrated by the cross-guarantee's enactment. Furthermore, the assessment of MNB was so drastic as to
destroy MNB's property interests completely, thereby constituting a
per se taking under Lucas. The court held that, absent a showing of
fraud, abuse, or disregard for separate corporate forms-the traditional ways in which limited liability may be extinguished-the gov24
ernment could not hold MNB liable for the debts of another bank. 7

267. Id. at 635.
268. Id. at 635-36.
269. Id. at 635. The court also dismissed the government's argument that the cross-guarantee deprived BNEC of only a piece of its "bundle" of property rights. Id. Rather, the court
found that the fact that BNEC happened to own other property was irrelevant to whether the
government must compensate for the total appropriation of one of its assets. Id.
270. Id. at 636.
271. Id. at 637.
272. Id. at 633.
273. Id. at 636-37.
274. The court did, however, give the government a second chance by remanding the case
for a determination of whether MNB and BNEC were operating as separate corporations or as a
single entity. Id. at 637. The court stated that, if the government could prove that the holding
company members were disregarding corporate separateness, those members could have no
reasonable expectation that they would not be treated by the law as a single corporation; thus,
imposition of cross-guarantee liability would comport with the Takings Clause. Id.
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Overall, the Branch court seemed fundamentally concerned
with the imposition of potentially destructive "no-fault" liability on
holding company members. 275 It was troubled by what it termed the

cross-guarantee's "irrebuttable presumption" of manipulation and
276
disregard for separate corporate status within holding companies.
The court7 believed that imposing liability on "innocents" is unconstitutional2

The Meriden and Branch cases are tremendously important,
and the issues they raise will almost certainly be litigated in the
Supreme Court. Both decisions, however, are flawed. Branch, in
particular, raises a number of problems. The next three Sections of
this Note illustrate the major problems with Branch and address
278
important issues not addressed by that case.

V. ANALYSIS
A. The ReasonableInvestment-Backed Expectations of Bank Holding
Company Shareholders
The Branch decision focused on the issue of whether the crossguarantee frustrates a holding company's reasonable expectations.
Its specific inquiry was: At the time the cross-guarantee was enacted,
did the shareholders of the subsidiary have a legitimate expectation
that they would not be held liable for the debts of another corporation?
1. The Proper Analysis of Investment-Backed Expectations
The Branch court set forth an unworkable approach for measuring investment-backed expectations. Its statement that MNB's
275. Id. ("Congress may not remedy the problems now confronting the federal banking
system by placing the financial burden on the backs of innocents).
276. Id.
277. See Zeppos, Developments in Administrative Law at 54 (cited in note 44) ("[Branch]
treats the imposition of liability on the other shareholders as if Congress in FIRREA had simply
dragooned an absolute stranger to the situation into the servitude of liability).
278. As a preliminary matter, it will be helpful to clarify the terminology this discussion
will use. Except where otherwise stated, the next Part will assume that bank holding
companies are the sole owners and shareholders of their subsidiaries. Accordingly, it will use
the shorthand term "holding company" to refer to the shareholders of the bank holding company
subsidiaries that are governed and affected by the cross-guarantee. In addition, when this Part
speaks of "holding company" interests, it is referring to the interests of the shareholders of the
holding company, who are the real parties in interest.
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shareholders had relied on the principle of limited liability since its
incorporation in 1889 suggests that expectations should be analyzed
as of the time the invested-in entity was created. This statement is
confusing because it implies that it is the expectations of the original
owners of the entity that matter in analyzing a takings claim by a
later investor.
These suggestions are clearly wrong. On a basic level, the
"real-world" expectations of a takings claimant are those that the
claimant had at the time of her acquisition. 279 Thus, a court should
ask two questions: (1) Who is the claimant, or true party in interest?,
and (2) When that party invested, what reasonable expectations did
she have? The Branch court answered both of these inquiries
incorrectly with the wrong answer to the second question resulting
from the wrong answer to the first. The Branch court's problem was
its insistence that MNB was the entity whose expectations were to be
measured, because it was MNB that was driven into insolvency by the
cross-guarantee assessment. It seemed natural, perhaps, to view
expectations from MNB's perspective; hence, the court looked to the
280
original investors to analyze expectations.
The court neglected to recognize, however, that MNB's liability
was, by definition, the liability of its shareholders; the shareholders
were the ones who suffered as a result of the cross-guarantee assessment. Moreover, because MNB's sole shareholder was BNEC, which
was in turn owned by its shareholders, it was in actuality the shareholders of BNEC who bore the brunt of MNB's assessment. Logical
expectations analysis therefore mandates that BNEC's shareholders'
expectations be the focal point. Because BNEC's shareholders had no
property interest in MNB until they acquired the subsidiary, their
expectations regarding MNB's right to limited liability arose at the
time of that acquisition. 281

279. Lucas, in fact, endorsed this analytical approach. 112 S. Ct. at 2899 (stating that
takings analysis begins with an inquiry into the claimant's "title to begin with'). See also
American Continental, 22 Cl. Ct. at 700 (finding no frustration of reasonable expectations
because the law at the time of acquisition allowed appointment of a government receiver); notes
176-78 and accompanying text.
280. Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 632.
281. In general, the Branch court's mistake demonstrates the importance of a precise
analysis of reasonable expectations; the problem of imprecision is likely to arise frequently in
the confusing world of holding company structures.

1788

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1741

2. Investment-Backed Expectations of Holding Companies
The Branch court argued that, even though MNB was subject
to a pervasive regulatory scheme, it had a legitimate expectation of
limited liability. 282 This conclusion was wrong for several reasons.
First, the court was incorrect in suggesting that the members
of a holding company structure have virtually a fundamental right to
limited liability that can be abrogated only in the traditional common
law ways. 283 The court did not explicitly state such a proposition, but

its holding that the government must make an actual showing of
fraud, abuse, or disregard for corporate separateness prior to utilizing
the cross-guarantee implies that holding companies have an absolute
right to limited liability unless they engage in such wrongdoing.
The court's position was radical, suggesting that any augmentation of corporate shareholder liability would frustrate legitimate
expectations, due to the exalted principle of limited liability. No prior
court, however, has suggested that limited liability is a near-constitutional right. Indeed, limited liability was statutorily created during
the last century and has been modified and abrogated in various ways
with no ill constitutional effects.2M Connolly and Concrete Pipe also
demonstrate that the Court has not elevated limited liability to the
285
status of a fundamental right.
A proper evaluation of a holding company's expectations focuses not on its "right" to limited liability, but on its reliance on that
privilege. The analysis should begin at the point when the holding
company acquired the shares of its subsidiary, thereby becoming a
holding company under the BHCA. Its expectations at that point
depend in part on the historical and current regulatory scheme to
which the holding company subjects itself.
As the above discussion demonstrates, banks and bank holding
companies are highly regulated; even prior to the Great Depression,
these institutions received constant legislative attention because of
the public interest in preserving a sound banking system. 288 When a
holding company acquires a subsidiary, it does so with full knowledge
of the overall regulatory scheme. It knows that its application to

282. Branch, 31 Fed. C1. at 634.
283. See note 64 (detailing several common law rationales for piercing the corporate veil).
284. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the history of limited liability
principles).
285. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 222-23; Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2289-90. See Part III.B.4.
286. See Part II.B.1 (describing the double liability system); notes 6-10 and accompanying
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obtain holding company status may be denied by the Federal Reserve
Board due to the company's lack of financial soundness, and it knows
that the reason for this condition is to prevent weak institutions from
acquiring concentrated capital.2s 7 It knows that its business activities
will be restricted because of the same fears.5 s It knows that it will be
subjected to numerous and constantly changing rules, restrictions,
and obligations.2 9 Before FIRREA, the holding company's (or its
subsidiary's) entitlement to limited liability was but one piece in a
regulatory puzzle designed to achieve certain legislative aims; it was
not a "right" pulled from the heavens.
Consideration of the policies behind the regulatory scheme
proves even more telling with regard to the holding company's reasonable expectations. The holding company is on notice not only that
legislation governing its operations exists, but that the legislation is
in great part intended to stifle the moral hazard problem facilitated
by deposit insurance. 290 It is aware of past legislative and administrative efforts to combat the problem, such as the source-ofstrength doctrine and the double liability system.2 91 It can recognize

that these regulatory efforts generally operated either by enhancing
governmental enforcement powers or by imposing added liabilities on
some or all of the holding company members. 292 Given the numerous
past attempts to deal with the moral hazard problem, the holding
company should know that the government is likely to look for ways
to increase its liabilities and obligations when it acquires a
subsidiary.
The holding company should also recognize that numerous
cases have held that expectations in a highly regulated industry are
very limited.293 Courts are generally deferential to the government
287. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
288. See note 50 and accompanying text.
289. See Parts IIA, II.B.1-2 (describing the pre-FIRREA regulatory scheme governing
holding companies).
290. See notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
291. See Parts II.B.1-2.
292. See id.
293. See notes 156-67 and accompanying text. Although in a theoretical sense it is troublesome to argue that case law on takings should influence reasonable expectations, as a practical
matter holding companies know of legal trends and know how those trends will affect them. As
in other areas of the law, where reasonable expectations provide the standard for evaluating an
abridgment of the claimant's rights, analyzing the reasonable investment-backed expectations of
a takings claimant is a circular process. The state of takings jurisprudence, as described above
in Part III.B, certainly shapes the expectations of potential investors. Simultaneously, the
expectations of those investors are a crucial factor that a court considers in deciding whether to
uphold the claim. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
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regarding challenges to legislation directed at highly regulated
entities, particularly banks. 294 Therefore, a holding company is aware
that it is unlikely to win a constitutional battle involving any new
regulation, restriction, or liability it may face when it acquires a
subsidiary.
The past and present regulatory scheme, and the case law
upholding that scheme, certainly put holding companies on notice
that measures like the cross-guarantee might be passed by Congress
and upheld by the courts. A clear counter argument, however, is that,
even though a holding company should expect certain additional burdens and obligations to be implemented, it should not be held to expect that its entitlement to limited liability will be stripped away as
part of some last-ditch attempt to salvage the FDIC. In other words,
one could argue that there is a line that the government cannot cross,
and the cross-guarantee's destruction of the century-old rule of
limited liability crosses that line.
It becomes evident, however, that the cross-guarantee does not
cross the line when one recognizes that the holding company structure
and the existence of deposit insurance essentially enable those companies to act in ways similar to those that would traditionally allow
the piercing of the corporate veil. The Branch court, by elevating
limited liability to the level of a fundamental right, ignored the evidence that the structure of bank holding companies, and the protection given them by deposit insurance, gives them the capability and
25
the incentive to act as a single enterprise.
In a nutshell, the very reason bank holding companies like the
deposit insurance system and want to be a part of it is the same reason such companies should have a very limited expectation of limited
liability. As mentioned above, because in holding companies a single
group of shareholders "controls" the operations of several different
entities, those shareholders have the capability to move assets from
one entity to another, strengthening one subsidiary at the expense of
another. 296 In addition, because of deposit insurance, such companies
are free to engage in such asset-shifting without the fear that, if one
(1967) (holding that reasonable expectations regarding a person's "zone of privacy" will determine whether or not a fourth amendment search has occurred).
294. See notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
295. See Curtis, 27 Harv. J. Legis. at 389 (cited in note 132) ("Because a bank holding
company group functions economically as a single entity, it is reasonable to assemble the value
of the entire system for the purpose of protecting the system's depositors"). But see Jackson,
107 Harv. L. Rev. at 566-67 (cited in note 19) (arguing that there is no evidence that holding
companies act in this manner).
296. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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of the affiliates fails, its depositors will have to be compensated.
Because holding companies have the ability and motivation to act as a
single enterprise, it is reasonable to allow the corporate veil of such
entities to be pierced by the cross-guarantee.
On a more basic level, holding companies are aware that Penn
Central and Concrete Pipe stand for the equitable proposition that a
property owner should pay for the benefits that she receives from a
regulatory scheme. The ability of holding companies to act as a single
enterprise because of their structure and deposit insurance
constitutes a benefit that should put them on notice that they will
have to face added liabilities.
In sum, history, theory, and case law suggest that holding
companies do not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation of
limited liability. Traditional takings analysis thus operates against a
finding that the expectations of bank holding company shareholders
have been defeated by the cross-guarantee. The threshold require297
ment for establishing a viable takings claim has not been met.

297. A separate consideration with regard to determining reasonable expectations concerns
the expectations of those shareholders of holding company affiliates who are not also shareholders of the holding company parent. Because under the BHCA "control" does not require 100%
ownership of a subsidiary's shares, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2), there may be "uncommon" shareholders of such a subsidiary who will face cross-guarantee liability. See note 96. The inquiry
regarding these shareholders is whether they have a more legitimate expectation of limited
liability due to the fact that they are not technically part of the holding company structure. The
Branch court did not have occasion to address this issue, as MNB was a wholly-owned subsidiary of BNEC. Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 628.
Such shareholders would certainly argue that they have a reasonable expectation that their
entitlement to limited liability will not be stripped away. They would claim that they have no
measure of control over the assets or operations of the other members of the holding company
structure. Because of this lack of control, they cannot be contributors to the moral hazard
problem. Such shareholders would argue that they are not exploiting the deposit insurance
system and are not to blame if the other owners of the subsidiary are engaging in such
exploitation.
The uncommon shareholders' argument is flawed on all levels, however. Such shareholders
have no more legitimate an expectation of limited liability than do their holding company
counterparts. First, the uncommon shareholders should be aware of the pervasive regulatory
scheme governing holding companies. Even if they invested in the bank prior to the holding
company's acquisition of a controlling share, once the bank becomes part of a holding company,
all of its shareholders should know of the regulations which then take effect. If the uncommon
shareholders are unhappy with the new regulatory regime, they may sell their shares.
Perhaps more importantly, the uncommon shareholders are unlikely to be displeased with
the fact that their bank has joined a holding company because they will directly benefit from the
holding company's ability to exploit deposit insurance. Even though the uncommon shareholders have no direct control over the assets of the other members of the holding company,
they will receive higher returns due to the holding company's ability to act as a single enterprise. Thus, uncommon shareholders have no greater expectations of limited liability than do
the common shareholders. The uncommon shareholders have chosen to invest in an entity
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3. Economic Risk-Assumption Theory
This Section examines an alternative approach to analyzing
the expectations of bank holding company shareholders that is not
generally expressed in case law, but is nevertheless instructive. This
approach posits that bank holding company shareholders have assumed the risk of adverse governmental regulation through a discount on the price of their investment. Because the negotiated acquisition price of a subsidiary bank reflects the possibility of regulatory
modifications which add liabilities, obligations, or restrictions, the
acquiring holding company has no legitimate expectation that it will
be compensated later when those regulatory changes take place.
Investors regularly factor risks into a determination of the
price that they will pay for a capital acquisition. 298 According to mi-

croeconomic theory, an investor's decision regarding whether to buy is
determined by a comparison of the present value of the expected
returns from that investment with the offered price.299 If the expected
returns are greater than the cost of investing, the investor will buy.
The expected returns from any given investment are in part dependent on the risks involved. 30 The question is how to measure the effect
the identifiable risks will have on the investment's returns.
Economists Robert Pindyck and Daniel Rubinfeld argue that in
order to quantify risk, one must recognize all possible outcomes of a
particular action and the probability that each outcome will occur.30'
Of course, it is impossible to know either of these things with
complete certainty. It is possible, however, to predict the range of
possible outcomes and the probability of their occurrence with some
degree of accuracy. Such predictions rely largely on experience. How
often has a particular event happened in the past? What types of
occurrences are typical?302

Although economists usually think of different types of outcomes when they speak of risk-business success and failure rates,
subject to pervasive regulation and have reaped the benefits of that choice. They therefore can
expect to be subject to concomitant obligations, such as cross-guarantee liability.
298. Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 133 (Macmillan, 1st ed.
1989).
299. Id. at 532 (describing the Net Present Value Criterion: "Invest if the present value of
the expected future cash flows from an investment is larger than the cost of the investment").
300. Id. at 533.
301. Id. at 134.
302. Id. The authors more specifically describe the factors considered as (1) the probability
of the occurrence of any given event, (2) the expected value attached to each event (which equals
the probability of the event times the increase or decrease in price per share), and (3) the
variability, or average deviation, which each event produces. Id. at 134-38.
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for example-it is entirely plausible to assume that investors consider
the risk of adverse governmental regulation when they decide
whether to buy into regulated entities. They may draw on their
knowledge of past governmental measures to know which types of
legislation are likely to be enacted. Likewise, they can measure the
frequency of change in the regulations governing the entity in which
they wish to invest. Thus, they can measure the probability of
adverse regulatory modifications. Such a determination will not be
absolutely accurate, but it will nevertheless affect the investors'
calculation of the "optimum price."
Another element involved in the measurement of risk's effect
on expected returns focuses on the value of each particular risk. For
example, if an investment will decline by $X per share if Event A
occurs, then Event A's effect on each share's value is its predicted
probability of occurrence multiplied by X.33 Again, potential investors

in highly regulated entities may draw on experience to calculate the
likely economic impact of adverse regulatory change.
Thus, potential investors in regulated entities have a sound
methodology by which to measure the effects of adverse regulatory
changes on the expected returns of their investment. A rational company thinking of acquiring a subsidiary and becoming a holding company would consider the above factors in determining its optimum
acquisition price. Knowing that holding companies are highly regulated, that regulations frequently change, and that such change may
adversely affect their return, the company will negotiate a price that
is lower than it would be if such factors were not present. In other
words, holding company shareholders pay a lower price per share,
reflecting the added risk they are assuming by investing in a highly
regulated entity. Having assumed this risk, such shareholders may
not claim a legitimate expectation that adverse regulatory measures
will not be enacted. Indeed, forcing the government to compensate
investors who have assumed such a risk gives those investors an
undue windfall.
Because a frustration of reasonable expectations is essential to
establish a taking, and because the cross-guarantee does not defeat
those expectations, the measure should pass constitutional muster.
The next two Sections, however, assume a defeat of expectations, and

303. Id. at 135.
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consider the other factors relevant in deciding whether the crossguarantee effects a taking.
B. The Economic Impact of the Cross-Guarantee
This section evaluates the second prong of the Penn Central
test: the economic impact of the cross-guarantee on the shareholders
of holding company affiliates.3

1

4

The economic impact of the measure

may not be nearly as great as the Branch court found. First, the court
was misguided in its analytical approach to the issue in that it
measured the effect of the cross-guarantee at the wrong time. Second,
the Branch court was wrong in finding that the exercise of that power
constituted a per se taking. This Section then examines different
ways to measure the reduction in the value of the shareholders'
property as of the time the cross-guarantee was enacted.
1. The Timing of the Economic Impact
The Branch court made an erroneous assumption in evaluating
the economic impact the cross-guarantee had on MNB. It considered
the economic harm to be the amount of the assessment, over $1 billion. The court reached this figure by measuring impact as of the
time the cross-guarantee was exercised, rather than as of the time of
its enactment. This analysis is flawed: the cross-guarantee had its
effect on holding companies as soon as it was enacted. As soon as
Congress enacted FIRREA, the owners of BNEC had the opportunity
to sell their ownership in MNB and mitigate their losses. Any
additional harm caused by the FDIC's exercise of the power was a risk
assumed by the holding company.
When the cross-guarantee was enacted, holding companies felt
an immediate diminution of their wealth because the statute placed
additional risks of liability upon the shareholders of all bank holding
company affiliates. At that point, the holding companies knew that if
they did not exert greater discipline over bank management to
minimize the risk of any affiliate's failure, they would face the
possibility of an assessment in the future. Thus, they had several
options: (1) do nothing and potentially face losing their entire investment due to one bank's failure, (2) expend greater resources on
monitoring bank management so as to prevent failure, or (3) sell their
subsidiaries (or their shares in such subsidiaries) for a lower price,
304. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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taking a potential loss on their investments. Any option would harm
the shareholders economically.
If a holding company picks option one, however, risking the
loss of its investment, it cannot claim at the time it is wiped out by
the assessment that the government destroyed the entire value of its
property. The holding company had the choices of minimizing the
risk of failure by increasing monitorization at the time the provision
was passed, or of selling its subsidiaries so as to completely avoid the
risks of the cross-guarantee. By declining to exercise either of these
options, it assumed the risk of losing it all. Compensating the holding
company for risks it has assumed would give the company a windfall
it does not deserve.
If a holding company picks option two, it will also face diminished wealth because its marginal costs of doing business will increase. It will have to spend more money to discipline bank management by way of inspections, audits, and the like. Its shareholders will
consequently receive smaller dividends. Again, by declining to sell its
subsidiaries so as to completely avoid the risk of cross-guarantee
liability, the holding company assumes the risk that, despite its preventive measures, an affiliate may fail. Thus, when the holding company is assessed, it may not rightly claim that the government has
destroyed its investment.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the correct
measure of a holding company's loss at the time of the enactment of
the cross-guarantee is the decrease in the sale price of the
subsidiaries plus transaction costs. If, for example, the holding
company could have sold its subsidiaries for $X prior to the crossguarantee's passage, then its loss will be the difference between $X
and $Y, the price it can get after the enactment, plus $Z, the
transaction costs of selling the subsidiaries. Any additional costs are
properly deemed risks that the holding company has assumed.
The next Sections attempt to measure the diminution of the
fair market value of holding company subsidiaries that resulted from
the cross-guarantee's enactment.
2. Per Se Taking?
MNB argued that the FDIC's assessment against it effected a
physical appropriation of its assets, and was therefore a per se tak-
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ing.305 The court agreed, stating that because the assessment drove

MNB into insolvency, allowing the government to seize its assets, it
constituted a physical appropriation.3 6 Although the court used the
wrong analysis,307 it left the operative question open: If the crossguarantee's impact is measured from the correct perspective, is it
possible that it may effect a per se taking?
It is unlikely that the enactment of a measure like the crossguarantee could possibly physically appropriate holding company
property, because it merely places a risk of liability on those companies, and is not an automatic assessment against them. As noted
above, holding companies have the immediate option of selling their
subsidiaries so as to avoid the risk. Thus, they may retain some value
in their investment, and may likewise avoid the physical asset seizure
experienced by MNB. The cross-guarantee's passage did not effect a
per se taking of holding company property.
Trends in the case law also militate against finding the enactment of the cross-guarantee to be a per se taking. As discussed above,
courts are loathe to read Loretto and Lucas to govern banking takings
cases, even where the government actually seizes all of the bank's
assets upon placing it into receivership.308
In general, then, the enactment of the cross-guarantee cannot
effect a per se taking. The next question is: How much did the crossguarantee's passage reduce the value of holding company property?
3. The Diminution of the Value of the Holding Companies' Property
Courts generally are wary of upholding a takings claim involving a regulation that merely diminishes the value of the claimant's
property. 3 9 To begin upholding such claims would be to start down a
slippery slope, invalidating any governmental actions that harm
people economically. However, the Penn Central Court mandated
310
that economic burdens be considered in evaluating a takings claim.
Thus, it is imperative to approximate the impact the cross-guarantee
had on holding companies when it was enacted.
As mentioned above, the passage of the cross-guarantee reduced the wealth of holding companies by placing an added risk of

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Branch, 31 Fed. C1. at 629.
Id.
See Part V.B.1.
See Part III.B.2.
See note 154 and accompanying text.
438 U.S. at 137.
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liability upon them. The wealth reduction is properly measured by
taking the difference between the fair market value of the holding
companies' subsidiaries before and after the measure was passed, and
adding transaction costs. 31 ' How much will fair market value drop?
That question must be answered from the perspective of a potential
post-cross-guarantee holding company investor. Given the additional
risks, how much will such an investor pay? Several factors indicate
that the reduction will not be drastic.
First, the increased costs the potential investor must incur to
discipline management may, to some degree, be passed down to the
bank's customers in the form of higher interest rates on loans and
lower rates on deposits. Of course, the ability to transfer the costs
depends on several factors. The demand for bank holding company
services may be relatively elastic due to the existence of competitors
providing similar services.3 12 In addition, there may be legal limits to
3 13
the banks' ability to pass down the costs of the cross-guarantee.
Overall, however, it is reasonable to assume that a portion of the
cross-guarantee's burden will fall on depositors, not on potential
investors.
Second, although a post-cross-guarantee investor will have to
spend money to discipline management so as to avoid affiliate failure,
it is predictable that those costs will decrease in the long-run. This is
because of the ex ante effect such disciplinary measures will have. As
managers become more aware of the adverse consequences of engaging in risky practices, they will be more likely to discipline themselves. Because the threat of the cross-guarantee is so grave, management will learn quickly that risking an affiliate in order to earn
big profits can spell doom, and may cost executives their jobs. As selfdiscipline increases, the costs of shareholder discipline fall, as does
31 4
the economic burden of the cross-guarantee on those shareholders.
Finally, because the cross-guarantee imposes an essentially
controllable risk on holding companies, rather than an uncontrollable
risk of liability, it will have less of an economic impact upon them. As
311. See Part V.B.1.
312. For a general discussion regarding demand elasticity, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
Microeconomics at 28-32 (cited in note 298).
313. For instance, state usury laws limit the interest rates banks may impose on
borrowers, constraining banks' ability to pass down the cross-guarantee's costs in this manner.
See, for example, N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-501 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995) ("Rate
of Interest; usury forbidden).
314. See note 56 (arguing that bank management has some incentive to exert self-discipline
even in the absence of the cross-guarantee's threat).
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an illustration, if the state passed a law providing for the
condemnation of several houses out of a particular group, all of the
homeowners would face an uncontrollable risk. If they tried to sell
their homes, a potential buyer would pay a lower price reflecting that
risk. If, on the other hand, the law stated that houses with
overgrown, weed-filled lawns would be condemned, the potential
buyers would be able to control the risk of condemnation, and would
thus be willing to pay a relatively higher price. The cross-guarantee
resembles the second example. Because the risk of liability may be
reduced through discipline over management, potential new investors
will be willing to pay more than they would if the risk were
uncontrollable. Therefore, the economic impact of the cross-guarantee
is not as drastic as it may first appear.
In conclusion, the proper analysis of the cross-guarantee's
economic impact focuses on the time of its enactment. If a court takes
all of the above factors into consideration, it will likely conclude that
the economic impact on the shareholders is not so drastic as to effect a
taking. Moreover, the cross-guarantee is one of the most efficient
ways in which to control the moral hazard problem, and is thus highly
beneficial to the public interest. When this positive impact on the
public interest is balanced against the comparatively lower long-term
impact on holding companies, it becomes clear that the crossguarantee is both efficient and equitable.
C. The Nature of the GovernmentalAction: Minimizing External
Costs to Society Through Risk Allocation
Until now, this Note has analyzed the effect the cross-guarantee has had on bank holding companies. It has argued that such companies have no legitimate expectation that they will never be held
responsible for another company's debts, noting that the crossguarantee's economic impact at the time of its enactment may not be
so great as it initially appears. Thus, the cross-guarantee is fair in
the sense that it does not unduly burden holding companies. This
Section considers the other side of the equation-the efficiency of the
cross-guarantee, using economic analysis to show that the measure
passes the means-ends test set forth in Dolan.315
Recall that the recent case of Dolan set forth the requirement
that a challenged regulation's means must be roughly proportional to

315. 114 S. Ct. at 2309. See notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
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the ends it intends to achieve.316 Thus, the proper inquiry regarding
the cross-guarantee is whether it is roughly proportionate to its goal
of combating the moral hazard problem. This Section posits that, in
economic terms, the cross-guarantee is intended to force holding
companies to internalize an externality-the costs to society caused
by the moral hazard problem, and concludes that the cross-guarantee
is an effective internalization mechanism.
The explanation for the necessity of governmental regulation of
banks begins with the Coase Theorem. 317 The Coase Theorem posits
that, in a world of zero transaction costs, the most efficient way to
eliminate the costs to society caused by the "externalities" of doing
business is to let parties bargain for the right to cause or prevent
those externalities. 31 8 For instance, if a factory is polluting a stream
in which fishermen fish, the most efficient solution is either to let the
fishermen pay the factory to stop polluting or to let the factory pay
the fishermen for the right to pollute. 319 The problem, however, is
that transaction costs exist in such a situation: the fishermen may be
320
disorganized, the parties must pay to negotiate, etc.

The moral hazard problem presents a classic Coase scenario.
Bank holding companies cause an external cost to society because the
marginal costs of doing business as a holding company are artificially
low due to the protection of deposit insurance. 32

Taxpayers, who

would bear the loss if the insurance funds were depleted, 22 suffer the
effects of this externality. Under the Coase Theorem, the taxpayers
and bank holding companies could negotiate a private solution to the
moral hazard problem. The transaction costs of such a solution,
however, would be enormous, far higher than the parties would be

316. 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20.
317. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (proposing
the theorem).
318. See Polinsky, Introductionto Law and Economics at 11-12 (cited in note 55) (using an
analogous example involving a negotiated solution between a factory emitting air pollution and
the residents of the town affected by the pollution).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 12-14.
321. With insurance, holding companies can offer risk-free deposits to customers, and can
thus attract such customers at a much lower cost than is possible without insurance.
322. Of course, it is possible that Congress could refuse to use taxpayer money to bail out
failed financial institutions. In that event, the depositors would bear the loss to the extent the
insurance funds were inadequate to fully reimburse them. As discussed above, however,
Congress chose to bail out the failed S&Ls in the most recent crisis. See note 84 and
accompanying text. This is the most likely sequence of events because of the strong public
interest in maintaining depositor confidence. See note 6 and accompanying text.
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willing to bear. 323 Therefore, governmental regulation is the most
efficient way of forcing bank holding companies' marginal costs back
up to the level at which they would be without deposit insurance. The
cross-guarantee effectively accomplishes this objective. By shifting
some of the risks of bank failure back to holding company
shareholders, the cross-guarantee works efficiently to minimize the
3
external costs caused by the moral hazard problem. 24
The cross-guarantee's efficacy may also be measured by comparing it to alternative policies that impose liability only on those
holding companies that can be shown to have engaged in abusively
risky practices. Any measure encouraging banks to behave more
conservatively will cause those banks to be more careful about
lending. As such, credit will be more difficult to obtain when banks
are subject to increased risks of liability. In analyzing an across-theboard rule like the cross-guarantee, one must compare the increased
costs of credit it causes with the costs of using more particularized
measures. For example, if the government decided to impose crossguarantee liability only on those institutions that can be shown to
have engaged in fraud or abusively high-risk behavior, the costs of
making that determination must be weighed against the increased
availability of credit that will result. The practice of imposing greater
liability based on abusively risky behavior may work in other settings;
in the automobile insurance industry, for instance, it is relatively easy
to determine when the insured gets three speeding tickets and causes
two accidents that she has engaged in risky behavior. Given the high
liquidity of bank assets, and the rapid transferability of such assets
among members of a holding company, however, it seems likely that
the government's costs in spotting high-risk practices will outweigh
the benefits of the increased availability of credit.25 Thus, it is far
323. This is due to the diffuseness and disorganization of taxpayers. See note 20
(discussing the diffusion of bank creditors).
324. For a full description of how legal measures can reduce the cost-free external effects of
doing business, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics at 644-53 (cited in note 298).
325. See note 78 (discussing the ease with which banks can commit fraud or engage in
risky practices unnoticed by regulators). One particularized measure-risk-based deposit
insurance premiums-has been implemented in an attempt to shift costs to bank shareholders,
thereby encouraging shareholder discipline over bank management. See note 16.
Another alternative that would, theoretically, improve depositor discipline over bank
management, is co-insurance, whereby depositors would be forced to absorb a percentage of any
loss their bank incurred. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Law and
Regulation 265 (Little, Brown, 1992) ("One example [of a private insurance market mechanism
to combat the inherent moral hazard problem] is coinsurance: The insured is required to bear a
part of the risk insured against, thus reducing the insured's incentives to let the harm occur").
Establishing co-insurance, however, may be politically infeasible because it imposes greater
liabilities on depositors. In addition, depositors would likely have inadequate information about
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from clear that particularized policies are more efficient than the
cross-guarantee.
In sum, the cross-guarantee should withstand even exacting
scrutiny by a court. It is effectively designed to minimize the deadweight loss to society caused by the moral hazard problem, and is
superior to alternative policies.
VI. CONCLUSION

It seems clear that the cross-guarantee is constitutional and
does not effect a taking without just compensation. It is both an equitable and an efficient way to combat the moral hazard problem and to
prevent another financial institutions crisis from occurring.
Holding company shareholders are well aware of what they are
getting into when they invest. They willingly submit to a wide range
of regulations intended to prevent or stifle the exploitation of the
deposit insurance system. They know that a great deal of legislative
attention has been paid to preserving both bank stability and the
solvency of the deposit insurance fund. They may, in fact, have paid
less for their shares because of these factors. Moreover, holding companies directly benefit from the system to which they subject themselves. Deposit insurance facilitates the activities in which holding
companies engage, so as to increase their overall profitability. It is
entirely fair to place the risks of failure on those who enjoy the
benefits of success.
In addition, these shareholders have not lost everything as a
result of the advent of the cross-guarantee. The measure undoubtedly
imposes additional short-term costs upon holding companies, decreasing the value of their shares, but those costs may be reduced over the
long run. The diminution in value is not so drastic as to render the
measure unconstitutional.

the nature of their banks' practices, making it difficult to discipline management effectively, and
thus rendering co-insurance relatively ineffective as a means of ensuring bank stability.
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Finally, courts considering the cross-guarantee should take
into account its efficacy as a public policy measure. The cross-guarantee is one of the most efficient ways to combat a problem of great
public import.
JenniferJ. Alexander*
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